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Abstract 
 
Title of Thesis:   Implementation of the Peace Accords in Guatemala 1990-the 
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Competition between the Government and NGOs 
 
Nicole L. Kleiman-Moran, Bachelor of Arts, 2016  
 
Thesis directed by:   Sueann Caulfield and Anthony Marcum 
 
 
The 1996 Guatemalan Peace Accords attempted to address the major issues and grievances 
remaining from a 36 year long civil war that had ravaged the country. Peace Accord 
implementation requires work both from a government and NGOs. Using the relationship 
typology developed by Adil Najam and Jennifer Costen, this study finds that the Guatemalan 
government formed three distinct types of relationships (cooperation, complementarity, and 
competition) with the NGOs depending on the persistent post conflict issue. The Guatemalan 
Government assumed a relationship of cooperation with the NGOs on human rights and 
memorialization issues. The two entities assumed a relationship of complementarity on refugees 
and on indigenous rights. Finally, the entities assumed a relationship of competition on justice 
issues. Applying political survival theory, developed by James Morrow, Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith, onto the relationship types utilized in post 
conflict Guatemala, I argue that these relationships developed as a result of the political survival 
motivation by the Government who formed these relationships to retain its power in post-conflict 
Guatemala. The relationships have led to mixed results in terms of the implementation of the 
Peace Accords.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Guatemala’s 36-year Civil War, persisting from 1960 through 1996, makes it Latin 
America’s longest internal conflict. The country continues to deal with direct consequences of 
the Civil War’s tactics and events, these include: the past human rights violations, a genocide 
allegation, and the legacy of disappeared persons. Furthermore, impunity is rampant in the 
country because many of the major perpetrators from the Civil War were never tried or 
convicted. The root causes of the Civil War are ever present in Guatemalan society, they include: 
inequality among indigenous peoples, discrimination, and poverty. This paper will examine the 
way in which the Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) have worked to address these grievances in post-conflict society. 
Beginning in 1990, the Guatemalan Government, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (the URNG)1 and the United Nations (UN) entered into peace negotiations. The 
finalized version of the Peace Accords was signed in 1996. From 1996 until the present, the 
Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan NGOs have been attempting to implement the 
extensive accords.2 The implementation stage is marked with successes in terms of new policies, 
programs, and departmental positions, but it also marred with major obstacles such as attacks on 
NGOs, a lack of political will, a lack of adequate funding, and continued discriminatory 
practices.  
																																																								
1 The URNG were the left wing socialist guerilla movement fighting against the Guatemalan Government during the 
Guatemalan Civil War. The origins of the URNG will be discussed more extensively later in the chapter.  
 
2 The Peace Accords had commitments for the URNG to adhere to. The primary focus was disarmament and 
demobilization. As a group they were tasked with converting into functioning members of society. They formed 
their own political party. According to the Peace Accords, the Guatemalan Government was the entity primarily 
responsible for implementing the Accords. 
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Peace accords are multi-faceted and can be best implemented through a combined effort 
of the government and NGOs. In the case of post-conflict Guatemala, the relationships between 
the Government and NGOs varied according to each Peace Agreement. The cooperation between 
the two entities was strongest on implementing human rights issues in Guatemala, specifically on 
education and memorializations. On refugees and indigenous rights, the Guatemalan 
Government worked collaboratively3 with NGOs to address the grievances of these large 
population groups. On justice issues, the Guatemalan Government and NGOs clearly diverged in 
goals and tactics, forming a competitive relationship in addressing justice issues. This variation 
in the relationships between the two entities then begs the questions, when do the Government 
and NGOs cooperate on peace accord implementation? When do they compete? What drives 
these relationships? These questions will be answered through a case study of Guatemala that 
will contribute to a broad discussion of these issues. 
 
History of the Guatemalan Civil War 
Guatemala’s Civil War originated with the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 
during an anti-communist uprising led by the conservative faction of society and backed by the 
United States (US) Government. The violence began in 1960 after a failed nationalistic uprising 
by a series of guerilla groups who opposed the repressive government.4 The uprising escalated 
the repressive rule across the country by a series of presidents who were all acting as military 
																																																								
3 Formally it is called by scholars a complementarity relationship (this type will be discussed more extensively later 
in this chapter) 
 
4 A group of left wing military officers from the National Military Academy led a failed revolt against the autocratic 
Guatemalan Government under Fuentes. The officers who survived the failed revolt fled into the hills, established 
communication with Fidel Castro, developed communist ideas, reached out to other organizations, and eventually 
developed into the larger guerilla movement 
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dictators throughout the entirety of the war. There were 12 presidents during the violent period.5 
The four initial guerilla groups were quickly destroyed.6 However, the Guatemalan guerilla 
movement’s ideas persisted and in the 1970s two new guerilla groups emerged: The People in 
Arms Revolutionary Organization (ORPA) and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). In 1982, 
the guerilla groups formed the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) that was “a 
unified command with a platform for a revolutionary government” (Costello et al., 1997, p. 39). 
Unfortunately, this unification was too little, too late: “the poorly-armed guerrillas were unable 
to defend their supporters in the rural highlands against the full brunt of military violence” 
(Costello et al., 1997, p. 39). It was during the period of fighting between the Guatemalan 
Government and the URNG that the country’s citizens suffered under the most repressive 
actions. The Civil War ended with a Peace Agreement in 1996 between the Government of 
Guatemala and URNG, which, at this point was weak, having been destroyed by the Guatemalan 
Army. 
The Civil War affected the majority of the country. The violence began in the east. 
During this period, victims were mainly peasants and guerilla sympathizers. As the violence 
became more geographically dispersed, those who were affected also expanded to include 
community leaders and outspoken social activists. In the bloodiest period (from 1978-1985), the 
operations were centered in Quiche, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, and Alta and Baja Verapaz 
(Mayan regions of the country). During this period the main victims were of Maya descent and 
the military carried out genocidal massacres (Tomoschat, Otillia & Tojo, 1999, p. 18).  
																																																								
5 The presidents who held power during these repressive periods and who are particularly noted for their vicious 
tactics are General Ríos Montt, Oscar Mejía Victores, and Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo. 
 
6 The guerilla groups included “the November 13th Revolutionary Movement, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the 
armed branch of the Guatemalan Worker’s Party (PGT), and the April 12th Revolutionary Front” (Paniagua, 
Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012, p. 11). 
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The Guatemalan army used a variety of strategies to destroy the guerillas and to harm 
civilians who were deemed enemies by the army. One tactic was a scorched earth policy utilized 
by the army between 1981 and 1983 against the indigenous population. The goal was to destroy 
communities that were considered to be guerilla support bases. This destruction by the army 
consisted of burning homes, slashing and burning crops and livestock, and bombing the villages 
(REMHI, 1999, p. 40). The physical destruction was compounded with other forms of violence: 
[The army] carried out merciless massacres of children, women, and the elderly and 
unarmed men. The soldiers tortured the population, raped women, disappeared and 
executed community. This provoked a massive displacement of the indigenous 
population which hid in the mountains, fled to other parts of the country or sought refuge 
in Mexico. (Paniagua, Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012, p. 18) 
 
The scorched earth policy was mainly directed at the indigenous population due to its potential to 
associate or aid the guerillas. To further control the indigenous villages, the military established 
Civil Defense Patrols (PAC). The PACs were state sponsored patrols made up of indigenous 
males tasked with guarding the villages and reporting any suspicious activity to the military. The 
PACs were labeled voluntary though failure to participate led the individual to be branded as a 
guerilla sympathizer. The PACs became as large as 900,000 members. As the eyes and ears for 
the army, the PACs monitored guerilla activities, limited guerilla sympathizers, and deterred 
future guerilla members from enlisting. The PACs allowed for the Guatemalan army to control 
the indigenous population from inside the rural communities (Costello et al., 1997, p. 40). A final 
tactic employed by the army was the creation of Development Pole Villages in 1983 throughout 
the rural regions of Guatemala to ensure complete control. The idea was that villagers who were 
displaced by violence in their communities would be resettled into a new community. In this new 
community, the army initiated psychological indoctrination aimed at garnering support for the 
Government rather than the guerillas and provided a way for the Government to keep eyes on the 
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“enemy” (USAID, 1988). These army strategies attempted to completely control the insurgents 
and all potential insurgents.  
Throughout the entire conflict, the army deployed a general terror campaign that included 
disappearances, extra judicial executions, massacres, rape, torture, illegal arrests, and genocide 
against their broad category of “enemy.” These acts of violence left numerous victims. The 
government-sponsored truth commission, named the Commission for Historical Clarification 
(CEH),7 registered a total “of 42,275 victims, including men, women and children. Of these, 
23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 were victims of forced disappearance”. The 
CEH also found 152 cases of rape, 4,219 instances of torture, and 5,079 instances of irregular 
detention during the Civil War. Furthermore, the Civil War produced up to one million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and over 200,000 refugees. Additionally, “eighty-three percent of fully 
identified victims were Mayan” (Tomoschat, Otillia & Tojo, 1999, p.13) leading the CEH to 
declare that acts of genocide took place during the Civil War (Costello et al., 1997, p. 292).8 The 
state sponsored truth commission probably underestimated the number of victims, as many other 
sources report the numbers to be as high as 180,000 victims (Costello et al., 1997, p. 292). The 
numbers are staggering and have left a post-conflict society riddled with grievances. With a 
number of victims this large, the question of responsibility arises: the CEH found the 
Guatemalan army responsible for 93% of all human rights violations during the war (Paniagua, 																																																								
7 The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) was established from the Peace Accords. CEH came from the 
“Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence 
that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer”. The commission presented its final report in 1999. 
 
8  The CEH used the internationally accepted of genocide. The definition of genocide, from the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, states: "genocide means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members 
of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” 
(Stanton, n.d.). Under this definition, the actions taken during the Civil War against the indigenous populations, 
namely the Mayan, constituted genocide. There was intent to destroy the ethnic group by killing, causing bodily 
harm, and using the scorched earth policy to lead to physical destruction.  
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Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012, p. 12).  The Guatemalan Peace Accords tried to provide a solution 
and future to a country where the state was found responsible for staggering numbers of crimes 
against its citizens. 
 
The Guatemalan Peace Accords 
 
In 1984, the armed conflict began to subside and the military government started to 
transition to democracy with the ousting of repressive General Rios Montt from power.  In 1985, 
a new Guatemala Constitution was signed and implemented. In 1986, the first post-war 
democratically elected president, Vinicio Cerezo, entered office with a pledge to end to the 
violence. In 1990 the Government began the formal peace negotiation process. It took six years 
for the Peace Accords to be negotiated, created, and signed. Within the process, the Government 
of Guatemala, Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), and the UN approved 
five agreements regarding the structure of the Peace Accord process.9 The signing of the Peace 
Accords on December 28, 1996 marked the official end of the Guatemalan Civil War. 
Within the Peace Accord process were a series of key actors. In support of the 
Guatemalan Peace Accords were the “friendly country” alliance,10 the International Monetary 
																																																								
9 The first agreement was The Basic Agreement on the Search for Peace by Political Means (the Oslo Accord), in 
1990 which set out arrangement for future government- URNG dialogues and allowed for the UN to act as mediator. 
The second agreement was The Agreement on the Procedure for the Search for Peace by Political Means (The 
Mexico Accord) in 1991 in which the parties set an agenda for the negotiations. The third agreement was The 
Framework Agreement on Democratization in the Search for Peace by Political Means (The Querétaro Agreement) 
in 1991 that examined the meaning and implication of democratization. The fourth agreement was The Framework 
Agreement for the Resumption of Negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity in 1994 which set ground rules for the negotiations, established Jean Arnault as the UN 
observer, invited Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the US and Venezuela to be ‘friendly country’ guarantors of 
the process, and assigned to the UN the responsibility for verification. Finally, the fifth agreement was The 
Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations on a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala in 1994 that set a schedule 
for the negotiations (Costello et al., 1997, p. 84). 
 
10 The ‘Friendly Alliance’ included Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, USA, and Venezuela. 
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Fund, the World Bank,11 and a variety of religious organizations.12 Furthermore, the Guatemalan 
Peace Accords have been lauded for their participatory mechanisms that allowed for citizens and 
NGOs to partake in a series of commissions and dialogues about their content. In 1994, the Civil 
Society Association (ASC) was established to represent the voices of civil society within the 
Accords process (Salvesen, 2002, p. 25). In opposition to the Peace Accords were the army and 
high-ranking officials who were actively involved in the war crimes and many of whom have 
retained power, either continuing to lead the army or as elected or politically appointed 
government officials (Paniagua, Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012, p. 11). There has been continual 
resistance of the Peace Accords by some members of the Government because the Agreements 
pose a threat to its power. 
The Peace Accords brought hope to a war torn country. The Peace Accords included 11 
different agreements listed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
11 “Once the momentum for a political settlement had begun to build in the early 1990s, the range of donors 
affiliated to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Consultative Group began to tie its support for 
Guatemala to a comprehensive neo-liberal agenda” (Costello et al., 1997, p. 83). 
 
12 The religious organizations include: Lutheran World Federation, Latin American Council of Churches, the World 
Council of Churches, and the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA (Costello et al., 1997, p. 84). 
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13 Costello et al., 1997, p. 86 
 
Table 1: List of Agreements in the Guatemalan Peace Accords13 
Agreement Name Year Summary of Agreement 
Agreement on the Establishment of 
the Commission to Clarify Past 
Human Rights Violations and Acts 
of Violence that have Caused the 
Guatemalan Population to Suffer 
 
1994 “Defines a process for investigating human rights abuses taking 
place between the beginning of the war and the signing of the 
final peace agreement, and for producing recommendations that 
contribute to national reconciliation”. 
 
Agreement on the Resettlement of 
Population Groups Uprooted by the 
Armed Conflict 
1994 “The government commits itself to guarantee the conditions 
necessary for the safe return of the internally displaced to their 
places of origin or to another place of their choice, to promote the 
return of land abandoned by uprooted populations, and to involve 
them in the design and implementation of a comprehensive 
reintegration plan”. 
 
Comprehensive Agreement on 
Human Rights 
1994 Both the URNG and the government commit themselves to  
“fully observe human rights and to improve mechanisms for their 
protection” 
 
Agreement on the Identity and 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
1995 Contains four chapters that include broad commitments to 
recognize the identity of indigenous peoples, to eliminate 
discrimination against them and to guarantee their cultural, civil, 
political, social and economic rights. 
 
Agreement on the Basis of Legal 
Integration of URNG 
1996 Provides a comprehensive program for the integration of URNG 
members into Guatemalan society 
 
Agreement on Constitutional 
Reforms and Electoral Regime 
1996 Creates a series of proposals for constitutional reforms; “the 
proposals focus mainly on the recognition of the identity and 
rights of indigenous peoples and the mandate and structure of the 
country’s security forces” 
 
Agreement on the Strengthening of 
Civilian Power 
1996 Includes a series changes related to the strengthening of the three 
branches of the new democratic government. The Agreement 
calls for an overhaul to the security functions of the state 
including the civil patrols, the police, the penal code, and the 
army.  
 
Agreement on Social and 
Economic Aspects and Agrarian 
Situation 
1996 Contains four chapters. The first contains provisions for broader 
civic participation in all levels of the Government. The second 
guarantees economic growth. Chapter three focuses on rural 
development projects. Chapter four “promises increases in the tax 
base and a range of measures against tax evasion and fraud”. 
 
Agreement on a Definitive 
Ceasefire 
1996 Established a 60-day timetable for URNG disarmament and 
demobilization 
 
Agreement on the Implementation, 
Compliance and Verification 
Timetable 
1996 Creates a “detailed guide for the implementation of all the 
commitments undertaken since 1994. It sets out a calendar for 
their phased implementation from 1997 to the end of 2000 and 
for the establishment of a Follow-up Commission to ensure that 
the process is carried out effectively” 
 
The Agreement on a Firm and 
Lasting Peace 
1996 “Trigger[ed] implementation of all the previous agreements and 
binds them into a comprehensive nationwide agenda for peace” 
	 9 
The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, the Agreement on the Resettlement of 
Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict, the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power will be discussed 
in greater extent in the subsequent chapters. These four Agreements explicitly address the largest 
issues resulting and remaining from the Civil War. These four Agreements also demonstrate the 
three relationship types between the Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan NGOs during 
implementation. 
Though extensive in their coverage, the Peace Accords were plagued by a series of 
weaknesses. A major weakness was a lack of a coherent, central leadership to ensure 
implementation. The Guatemalan agencies had a watchdog role rather than an implementing role 
and there was no broad oversight. Other weaknesses included a lack of: financial resources to 
fund different programs and positions, trained personnel to run the programs, and political will to 
instigate implementation (Costello et al., 1997, p. 83). Furthermore, the results of a vote in 1999 
created a major weakness for the implementation of the Peace Accords. Key components of the 
Accords needed to be included in the Guatemalan Constitution to receive greater political and 
financial support. A popular referendum on the various Peace Agreements was held in 1999 and 
failed. The reasons for the failed referendum include: only 18% of the population voted due to 
high abstentions in the country, the number of reforms created confusion among the general 
public,14 and there was a powerful anti-reform publicity campaign before the vote by those 
opposed to the Accords (Stanley & Holiday, n.d., p. 21). Though the failure of the constitutional 
reform did not make the implementation of the Peace Accords impossible, it significantly slowed 
																																																								
14 “In the process [of debates in Congress], the package of proposed reforms grew from the minimal 12 required to 
implement the accords to 39 substantive reforms, 3 reforms that proposed minor changes in wording, and 8 
transitory articles” (Stanley & Holiday, n.d., p. 25). 
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down the process. Because the Accords no longer had constitutional guarantees, the Government 
and NGOs had to utilize aspects of the government outside of the constitution and programs 
outside of government control to implement the Peace Accords. 
In response to the signing of the Peace Accords, four new organizations were created to help 
the implementation process. The first directly stemmed from the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Human Rights. The United Nations established the United Nations Verification Mission in 
Guatemala (MINUGUA), officially deployed in 1997. MINUGUA was tasked with aiding the 
implementation of the Peace Accords. Its role was:  
(i) To deal with and verify complaints of human rights violations; (ii) to monitor the 
performance of state institutions in dealing with these abuses; (iii) to conduct public 
information and education campaigns; (iv) to provide institutional support to existing human 
rights organizations; and (v), to make general recommendations to promote the full 
observance of human rights. (Costello et al., 1997, p. 85) 
 
MINUGUA’s mandate lasted for seven years, ending in 2004. MINUGUA played a large role in 
how the Peace Accords were implemented and how post-conflict Guatemala looked. The other 
three organizations, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala,15 A Follow 
Up Commission,16 and the Secretariat for Peace17 were put into place to try to ensure that the 
Government and society kept the ideals and practices of the Peace Accords alive and intact 
through the whole implementation phase. 
																																																								
15 The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was created in 2007. Its goal was to help 
the Guatemalan Government restore the justice system through investigations and recommendations (“Guatemala’s 
Crippled Peace Process”, 2011). CICIG will be discussed more extensively in Chapter Four. 
 
16 A Follow Up Commission was created in 1997 to help ensure compliance with the Peace Accords by having 
diverse representatives review bills drafted by the government to ensure that they are following the Peace Accords. 
The makeup of the Commission was “two representatives from the parties [the Government and the URNG], one 
from Congress, four representatives from different sectors of civil society and the head of MINUGUA” (Salvesen, 
2002, p. 25) 
 
17 The Secretariat for Peace (SEPAZ) was created in 1999. The Secretariat was a mechanism to ensure the 
institutionalization of peace by certifying that the plans and projects of the Guatemalan Presidents were in 
accordance with the Peace Accords (Salvesen, 2002, p. 26). 
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An additional move to establish peace was the creation of two truth commissions.  The 
first Commission (CEH), established by the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission 
to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations in 1994, released their report in 1999. The other truth 
commission, created by the Catholic Church in Guatemala, released their report, Guatemala 
Nunca Más, in 1998. Guatemala Nunca Mas provided a different perspective from the 
Government sponsored truth commission by provided a better chronology of the victims’ 
suffering (Paniagua, Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012, p. 123). The truth commissions established 
the facts of the war, the statistics, the background causes, and a list of perpetrators. The 
Commissions had mixed reception. For many, receiving a complete documentation of the 
realities of war acted as a first step towards reconciliation. However, to those whom were 
involved as perpetrators in the Civil War, the truth commissions exposed an abhorrent history 
and placed blame thereby creating active opposition.   
The Peace Accords do not operate alone; they often respond to and support international 
conventions. In Latin America, during the last two decades of the 20th century, many counties, 
including Guatemala, recognized and ratified international human rights laws during the re-
establishment of democracy in their states. “It is likely that part of the motivation was the need to 
protect their democracies against the danger of being overthrown. However, these ratifications 
were also intended to signal the countries’ newly reestablished democratic identity and their 
reentry into the community of democratic states” (Lutz & Sikkink, 2001, p.7). In the case of 
Guatemala, many of the conventions were adopted in a time of transition and during the 
implementation phase of the Peace Accords as a way to signal to the international community 
their commitment to the content of the Peace Accords.18 The ratification of these treaties is 																																																								
18 Guatemala has signed all major Human Rights Conventions. For a complete list refer to the University of 
Minnesota’s compilation. 
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indicative of the Guatemalan Government’s effort to retain power in the newly democratizing 
country and in light of international pressures. 
 
Discussion of the Two Major Entities Involved 
 
 This thesis will refer to two different entities: The Guatemalan Government and the 
Guatemalan NGOs. The Guatemalan Government is a complex entity that has transformed since 
the beginning of the Peace Accord process. Guatemala operates under a constitutional 
democratic republic government. Since 1986, with the election of the first president under the 
new constitution, there have been 11 Guatemalan presidents. For the purpose of this thesis, I will 
examine the politics and decisions of the five most influential presidents in regards to the Peace 
Accord implementation. These five presidents are: Cerezo (1986-1993), De Leon (1993-1996), 
Arzu (1996-2000), Portillo (2000-2004), and Berger (2004-2008). The presidential regimes are 
all marked as coalition governments; the presidents were struggling to balance different factions 
and political parties. The regimes were not monolithic: they were composed of progressive 
representation (such as civil society actors and NGOs) as well as right wing representatives who 
had equal, if not greater, influence in the government. The coalition governments all required 
compromises to appease the factions involved and these compromises led to mixed and slow 
implementation of the Peace Accords. 
 Vinicio Cerezo was elected in 1986 as the first president under the new Guatemalan 
Constitution. Cerezo was in power from 1986 to 1991. Cerezo, a member of the moderate 
Guatemalan Christian Democrats, opposed Rios Montt’s regime during the Civil War. Upon his 
inauguration, Cerezo prioritized ending political violence. During his term, he created the 
Human Rights Committee, established the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, and enacted 
new laws for habeas corpus (Agency and Department, 2012). Cerezo’s efforts ushered in a 
	 13 
period of Peace Accord negotiation, creation, and eventually the signing of the Guatemalan 
Accords. 
 Ramiro De Leon Carpio, former Human Rights Ombudsman, was elected by the 
Guatemalan Congress to the Presidency in 1993 after a series of coups and a brief period of 
repression and violence.19 De Leon launched an anti-corruption campaign aiming to ‘purify’ 
Congress and the Supreme Court through the forced resignation of numerous members. Under 
De Leon, the Guatemalan Peace Accords Process developed and progressed (Agency and 
Department, 2012). 
 In 1996, Alvaro Arzu, member of the center-right Unionist Party, was elected president. 
Under Arzu, the peace negotiations were concluded, the Government officially signed the Peace 
Accords in 1996 ending the 36 year long Civil War, and the human rights situation in the country 
improved (Agency and Department, 2012). Arzu beat Alfonso Portillo by a near margin (3%). 
This narrow defeat was significant because Portillo was supported by ex-dictator Efrain Rios 
Montt (“Timeline of Guatemala”, 2016). This was indicative of the state of political affairs and 
the reality in Guatemala during this regime since a large number of voters supported a candidate 
representing a time of repression and violence. Another indication of the mixed political climate 
was when Arzu appointed Bishop Mario Rios Montt, the brother of former dictator General 
Efrain Rios Montt, to the head of the Guatemalan human rights office (“Timeline of Guatemala”, 
2016). It was also under Arzu that the Constitutional Referendum in 1999 failed and hindered the 
																																																								
19 “On May 25, 1993, Serrano [as an attempt to re-implement the military regime] illegally dissolved Congress and 
the Supreme Court and tried to restrict civil freedoms, allegedly to fight corruption. The ‘autogolpe’ (or self-initiated 
coup) failed due to unified, strong protests by most elements of Guatemalan society, international pressure, and the 
army's enforcement of the decisions of the Court of Constitutionality, which ruled against the attempted takeover. 
Serrano fled the country” (US Department of State, 2007).  
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progress of the Peace Accords implementation. Under Arzu, the two truth Commissions released 
their findings. Arzu’s term proved to be varied in terms of progress for the Peace Accords. 
Alfonso Portillo, a member of the modern, reformist Guatemalan Christian Democracy 
party won the election in 1999 and was inaugurated in 2000; he retained power until 2004. 
Portillo’s term was mixed regarding implementation of the Peace Accords. Rios Montt, former 
dictator, was the head of Congress indicating the ongoing impunity during this term. However, it 
was during Portillo’s term that the first indictment against Montt was filed in the Guatemalan’s 
courts. Unfortunately this case was stalled, delayed and fought for more than ten years. Under 
Portillo a series of exhumations of the remains of victims of Government massacres and 
disappearances took place, Congress passed anti-discrimination laws, and a series of anti-
impunity cases took place (“Timeline of Guatemala”, 2016). Portillo’s term can be labeled as a 
mixed success for the Peace Accords. Notably, during the terms of De Leon, Arzu, and Portillo, 
attacks on human rights defenders occurred and increased. This trend has continued through the 
terms of all presidents through the present. 
Oscar Berger, former Mayor of Guatemala City and member of the conservative, right 
wing Grand National Alliance party, began his presidency in 2004, remaining in office until 
2008. Berger’s term was one of improvement for the country and progress for the 
implementation of the Peace Accords. Under Berger, Guatemala signed an agreement with the 
UN, forming the CICIG program, to handle organized crime and human rights cases. Under 
Berger, Rios Montt lost his parliamentary immunity when he was not reelected for Congress, and 
was therefore prosecutable. Berger recruited Nobel Peace prizewinner Rigoberta Menchu to 
become a top official in charge of monitoring adherence to the Peace Accords. Berger worked to 
alleviate poverty, a root cause of the war. He also cut spending to the army, a requirement of the 
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Accords that had been delayed. Berger’s Government publicly admitted the responsibility by the 
state of human rights violations during the Civil War (“Timeline of Guatemala”, 2016).  Berger’s 
term, in general, proved beneficial to the struggle for justice.  
The other presidents who were inaugurated since 2008 have had a similar path to most of 
the presidents: varied, with progress and obstacles for the implementation of the Peace Accords. 
From 2008 until the present, there has been a marked increase in anti-impunity cases accepted by 
the Guatemalan courts. But, there has also been an increase in attacks on human rights defenders, 
drug related violence, and corruption.20  
 This brief, simplified timeline of significant presidents in the Peace Accord 
implementation phase will guide the analysis of how the Government reacted and interacted with 
NGOs. As a constitutionally democratic republic, the government has been composed of left 
wing, right wing, and central political parties, though traditionally the presidents have been right 
wing. As the Civil War’s end draws further away, the government has tended to become younger 
and less polarized. Throughout this thesis it is important to remember that a government entails 
many positions. Therefore to classify a government as supportive, neutral, or opposed to the 
Accords is inaccurate. Within each of the presidencies since the Peace Accords there have been 
people actively fighting for the implementation of the Accords, there have also been those who 
are not engaged in the implementation, and they has been some in direct opposition. None of the 
terms have been marked by all positive or all negative aspects, rather each was a mixed result in 
terms of Peace Accord implementation. This project will use the broad term of government in 
subsequent chapters to simplify the narrative. The reader can place the government within a 
																																																								
20 Corruption scandals so large as to lead to the resignation of President Otto Perez Molina amid demands by 
civilians. This will be discussed more in Chapter Three.  
	 16 
specific presidential term if interested by using this section and the historical timeline in the 
appendix. 
 The Guatemalan NGOs refer broadly to groups of social activists and civil society actors 
whom are working in post-conflict Guatemala. In chapters two through four, the individual 
NGOs will be discussed in greater detail when referring to specific grievances and relationship 
types.  
 
Literature Review 
 
 This brief historical narrative on the Civil War, the Peace Accords, and the post-conflict 
situation now is supplemented with a literature review on peace accords and on Guatemala. The 
available literature on peace accords covers both the content of the accords and the 
implementation of the accords, though content is covered more extensively. There also is 
research on Guatemala’s peace accord process and implementation stage. The analyses will be 
used to help guide this thesis’ research question and argument regarding post-conflict 
Guatemala.  
 
Literature Review on Peace Accords/ Peace Building 
 
Peace Accord theory can be divided into two parts: the content of the peace accords and the 
implementation phase. 
Scholars have identified certain factors that lead to successful peace accords. These factors 
include police and judicial reform and human rights capacity building because they hold long-
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term benefits on the implementation phase (Stedman, 2001, p. 3).21 Another vital clause concerns 
the demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into society; this is crucial for the 
implementation phase to ensure that the peace holds between the two parties (Stedman, 2001, 
p.16). Refugees must be part of the peace accords in some fashion, typically through repatriation. 
Regardless of how they are accounted for, the refugees must be discussed during the peace 
accords because, as a population, they require particular attention and services, often contingent 
on funding (Stedman, 2001, p. 18). These factors all focus on the content of peace accords. 
Scholars have studied the implementation process, sometimes called the peace building 
process, significantly less than they have studied the peace accords themselves. This disparity 
leaves a major gap in the literature. The content of the peace accords and that process cannot be 
minimized. But, the implementation phase is noted across the board as the most vital stage. It is 
also the most volatile stage. Therefore, the dearth of information regarding the implementation 
process is alarming.  
The literature on the implementation process emphasizes that this is the phase where the hard 
work and compromises from the peace accords must be put into place and acted upon. If the 
accords are not implemented, conflict can quickly arise again (DeRouen et al., 2001, p. 334). 
“Vital issues should be framed in the peace agreement in such a way as to lend themselves to be 
implemented speedily, simultaneously and around the time of the signing of a peace agreement” 
(Arnault, 2006, p. 13). As noted above, certain issues should be covered in the content of 
successful peace accords, but effective implementation requires quick actions on these same 
issues. “The chances for the successful implementation of a peace accord are increased by a 
general feeling of ownership of it and by its promotion by civil society” (Salvesen, 2002, p. 7). 																																																								
21 Police and judicial reforms can limit the reemergence of violence and can lead to anti-impunity measures. Human 
rights capacity building leads to an improved post-conflict society. 
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The sentiment of ownership comes from a societal agreement with the content. Therefore, it is 
essential that the peace accords account for large sectors of society in their content to allow for 
effective implementation. Civil society, including NGOs, can aid in the realization of the 
Accords by working on a ground level and addressing key issues usually tied to root causes of 
the war. “Moreover, local organizations tend to have a longer time horizon and are more adept at 
sustaining long term processes that are integral to peace-building (Stedman, 2001, p. 19). Civil 
society organizations can help ensure that implementation is carried out. Third party 
involvement, like the UN, can also safeguard the implementation process (Salvesen, 2002, p. 8).  
Both civil society organizations and third party groups are especially important in light of the 
many obstacles that exist during the implementation phase. Some barriers that can lead to failed 
implementation include:  
The physical security of the parties; Protection from judicial prosecution for actions relating 
to the conflict; The socioeconomic welfare of the leadership and combatants; The political 
viability of the parties, including their financial basis; Substantive aspirations that are 
deemed of vital interest by the parties, here these imply access to government positions 
(power sharing), changes in the political regime (democratization- demilitarization, fair 
electoral procedures and respect for political rights) or reforms in the socioeconomic and 
cultural underpinnings of the distribution of power. (Arnault, 2006, p. 6) 
 
If these issues are present, the implementation phase may be plagued by a lack of political will, 
more conflict and debate, and eventually a failed peace. Political will is a major aspect of the 
implementation phase; in order for the accords to be implemented, there must be a force in the 
government that is advocating for them. Political will stems from a sense of security by the 
government about their political position and power, this motivation will be discussed in greater 
length later in the chapter. Additionally, a government may want to implement the accords but 
may be limited by insufficient resources (Salvesen, 2002, p. 6).  
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 The available literature on peace accord content and peace accord implementation helps 
guide this project’s research and analysis. 
 
Literature Review on Guatemalan Peace Accords and Implementation 
 
 There is substantial literature on the Guatemalan Peace Accord process. When looking at 
the content of the Guatemalan Peace Accords, scholars have noted that the Guatemalan Peace 
Accords were too extensive. They covered too many broad, societal issues and did not prioritize 
the Agreements. The content of the Guatemalan Peace Accords made the implementation stage 
more difficult (Salvesen, 2002, p. 1). Regarding the political will in Guatemala, scholars have 
noted how the political impetus was lost quickly after the signing of the Accords. Salvesen noted 
how a remedy to this situation would be an increased emphasis on the implementation stage and 
that the fundamental legal reforms needed to be passed as quickly as possible while political will 
and international support was still high (2002, p. 1).  Furthermore, academics have noted how, in 
Guatemala, the third party involvement, particularly MINUGUA, required a long-term 
commitment; a commitment that was longer than what was first declared in the Peace Accords. 
Fortunately, the international community extended MINUGUA’s contract and implemented 
additional international monitoring mechanisms to prolong the third party commitment 
(Salvesen, 2002, p.1). Scholars acknowledged the influence that MINUGUA played on 
Guatemala’s implementation phase, however, third parties cannot be the basis for successful 
implementation. The foundation for effective implementation needs to be grounded in the state 
and society. Guatemala kept the channel of judicial prosecution open. Even though de jure 
protection for past militants had been put into place in a country with a weak judiciary and high 
rates of victims fearing the justice system, a certain degree of precariousness existed in the post-
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conflict phase because some in positions of power could face prosecution. The threat of justice 
has led to a shaky implementation stage. Recently there has been progress on the justice front 
with cases against major past-militants (Arnault, 2006, p. 21), however, the justice reforms and 
anti-impunity measures still remain some of the least effectively implemented aspects of the 
Accords. 
With this in mind, scholars have debated the success of the Guatemalan peace process. In 
the most basic sense, scholars agree that the Accords have been successful since there was no 
outbreak of new conflict related violence. However, on a grander scale, Guatemala is suffering 
from increasing crime rates and most people have not felt an improvement to their standard of 
living (Salvesen, 2002, p. 1). Guatemalan society has not felt drastic improvements indicating 
that the implementation stage of Guatemala has been weak and ineffective. Scholars have 
examined Guatemala and concluded that it accomplished the Peace Accord phase but on the 
peace implementation/ peace building phase had mixed results. The varied results stem from how 
the Government and the NGOs (the two main entities who can aid in implementation) formed 
relationships. These relationships, which differ according to the varying Peace Agreements, 
directly influence how effective the implementation phase has been. 
 
Answer/Theory: 
 
During the post-conflict period, the Guatemalan Government acted in a way that 
protected its control and power. During the Peace Accord implementation phase, the 
Government formed cooperative relationships with NGOs when the NGOs did not pose a threat 
to the Government. The Government formed a relationship of complementarity as a way to reign 
in potential threats. And the Guatemala Government created a competitive relationship with 
NGOs when they posed a real threat to their power and status quo.  
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Theoretical Component on Political Motivation: 
 
 Political survival, coined by political scientists, international relations scholars, and other 
academics, is the desire to retain power and authority (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002, p. 22).  
This desire by the government “motivates the selection of policies and the allocation of benefits; 
it shapes the selection of political institutions and the objectives of foreign policy” (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2002, p. 22). The desire to remain in political office is embedded in the 
politician.  This desire shapes how a politician will act while in office. Academics have noted 
that competent leaders are those whom correctly analyze the political climate so as to retain 
power (Brown & Marcum, 2011, p. 146). The leader wants his supporters to view him as 
competent. This competency assessment by civilians is vital for the leader to retain power; if not 
viewed as capable, the leader may lose power through public disapproval, no reelection, or 
impeachment. Finally, the scholarship on political survival looks at the relationship of the 
government with its citizens: 
The behavior of leaders arises from their own self-interest in holding their positions. If 
that coincides with or is compatible with the welfare of the citizenry, then many will 
benefit. If the welfare of a leader and the welfare of the society are at odds – and our 
theory and data will indicate that they often are – then it is more likely to go well for the 
leader than for society. (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002, p. 32) 
 
Thus, if it is not within the leader’s best interest, his actions may not be beneficial to society as a 
whole. This is of the upmost important because in a post-conflict situation, such as that of 
Guatemala, where there are numerous grievances to address, the citizens may present issues to 
the government that are incompatible with its aims (of self preservation) and, therefore, the 
government’s actions will leave the citizenry displeased.  
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Theoretical Component on Relationships 
 
While scholars label Guatemala as a mixed result on the peace-building phase, there is 
evidence of efforts done by the Government and the NGOs within the country to implement the 
Accords. The relationships between a government and NGOs have been categorized by scholars 
into three groups: Cooperation, Complementarity, and Competition. 
The first relationship type is one of cooperation. Cooperation is likely when the 
government and the NGOs share similar goals and similar strategies for achieving them (Najam, 
2000, p. 384). Cooperation occurs under three conditions, when: “[a] there is a free flow of 
information between the two sectors, in which each informs the other of its respective operations 
where it is deemed necessary; [b] NGOs follow the government’s rules; and [c] government 
policy is neutral toward the NGO sector” (Costen, 1998, p. 370). Under cooperation, the 
relationship between the two entities is of respect and/or neutrality. There are three activities that 
are found within a cooperative relationship and to which both sides can benefit from: information 
sharing, resource sharing and joint actions (Costen, 1998, p. 370).22 The congruent strategies of 
the two entities embody these three activities. Finally, of importance is that in a cooperative 
relationship a “government is sympathetic to NGO efforts but not necessarily proactive in their 
support” (Costen, 1998, p. 370). This is a crucial distinction because it alludes to the possibility 
of a relationship of tolerance rather than active support. Cooperation is the pursuit of the same 
goal using similar strategies.  
																																																								
22 “Mechanisms for information sharing can range from response to informal inquiries to ‘distributing reports; 
holding meetings, briefings or seminars; setting up liaison units; of forming committees.’ Resources sharing can 
include user fees and volunteer labor, or more formally ‘loans, grants, budget allocations, contracts and agreements, 
and secondment of personnel or equipment’. Finally, joint action is the collaborative engagement in activities 
between two organizations using their own resources” (Costen, 1998, p. 370). 
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The second type of relationship is that of complementarity. Complementarity results 
when governments and NGOs share similar goals but prefer different strategies (Najam, 2000, p. 
387). For a complementary relationship to work, a degree of cooperation is needed: 
NGOs must work within the rules set by government […] this also means that NGOs 
must not resist, compete, or rival government efforts. Complementarity is built on some 
minimum degree of mutual respect, where the rights of each to operate are 
acknowledged. In other words, government must not repress or rival NGOs, and NGOs 
should not inhibit the proper expansion of government efforts in particular geographical 
and service areas. (Costen, 1998, p. 372) 
 
Once a degree of cooperation is established, the complementary relationship can develop more. 
This relationship is based on the use of the NGO’s bottom up approach paired with the top down 
actions of the government. Their strategies are divergent here because of the relative power each 
entity has in their approach. NGOs are able to work on a broader ground level because of their 
composition and structure whereas the government has laws and institutions behind them to 
support their top down approach. This relationship can also be “geographically complementary, 
where NGOs provide outreach to remote areas inaccessible to or not prioritized by government” 
(Costen, 1998, p. 371). Complementarity is the pursuit of the same goal from different strategies. 
The final type of relationship is that of competition. A relationship of competition23 is 
one in which the government and the NGOs are not working together. Competitive relationships 
are likely when the two parties consider “each other’s goals and strategies to be antithetical to 
their own” (Najam, 2000, p. 385). The basis for this relationship type rests in the perceived threat 
to governmental power. Governments will avoid relationships with groups who challenge their 
“political control or provide political bases for subversion. This perspective is not unreasonable, 
especially when one considers NGOs’ frequent role in pressing for government accountability 
and their work in such volatile areas as human rights, the environment and the mobilization of 																																																								
23 Sometimes called a confrontational relationship 
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the poor” (Costen, 1998, p. 365). It is not within a government’s best interest to enter into a 
cooperative relationship with their potential opposition/ enemy. This type of relationship exists 
when NGOs emerge as forces of reaction to particular government policies or when NGOs urge 
for policy changes (Najam, 2000, p. 386). Relationships of competition are based on perceived 
threats to power.  
 The three relationships provide information onto why and when the Guatemalan 
government decided to cooperate and/or compete with the local NGOs on post-conflict issues. 
 
Argument: 
  
The Guatemalan Civil War resulted in a myriad of lingering grievances.  In the aftermath 
of the conflict, the Peace Accords attempted to address these injustices, but implementation has 
been mixed.  I will focus on the implementation of provisions of the Accords that were designed 
to address three major issues: human rights and memorializations, refugees and indigenous 
rights, and justice.  
On human rights issues, the Guatemalan Government and NGOs formed a cooperative 
relationship to implement the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights. They collaborated 
on memorializing victims from the Civil War; creating education curriculums covering the facts 
of the war, anti-discrimination ideals, and issues of (in) equality; and in developing civic 
participation programs across the nation. Guatemala was under the international spotlight during 
and after the Peace Accords process. This international pressure encouraged the newly 
democratizing Government to implement the Peace Accords to retain power in post-conflict 
Guatemala. The Government utilized all its available resources to address the international 
pressure; one of these crucial resources was NGOs. Retaining power included maintaining their 
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international reputation and avoiding the consequences of naming and shaming techniques.24 The 
Government sought to appear favorably to their international funders. The acted in a way to 
guarantee funding for different government programs so as to retain status and support from their 
constituents. Accordingly, as a way to preserve their power internationally, a cooperative 
relationship was utilized.  
The Guatemalan Government and NGOs adopted a relationship of complementarity when 
addressing refugee repatriation and indigenous rights, as specified by the Guatemalan Peace 
Accords. This type of relationship formed because the refugee and indigenous populations 
consisted of large sectors of society, thus, had their grievances not been addressed, they could 
have posed as a direct threat to the Guatemalan Government. Their force by numbers led the 
Government to complement the work of NGOs on these issues. In order to maintain its status 
quo and power, the Government worked with these large populations, or at least gave them the 
illusion of inclusion, so as to squelch their potentially disrupting calls for policy changes and 
actions.  
The relative strength of international and domestic pressures help explain why 
relationships of cooperation and relationships of complementarity formed. As this paper will 
demonstrate, a cooperative relationship developed between the state and NGOS around human 
rights issues because the international community incentivized the Government to act. The 
international community monitored whether the state was implement the Accords and made 
offers of financial support contingent on the state’s compliance. The direct pressures influenced 
the state to act as powerfully and proactively as it could, which meant utilizing the help of the 																																																								
24 Naming and shaming is a practice whereby actors attempt to publicize different activities and events of different 
countries/ actors. The publicity is usually over something seen are morally repugnant or a violation of human rights. 
The naming leads to shaming for the country/actor named. Naming and shaming hurts reputations. “The naming and 
shaming mechanism can produce enough pressure on violating states to make some positive changes” (Tsutsui et al., 
2012).  
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NGOs.  A complementary relationship between the two entities developed as they addressed 
refugee and indigenous rights because although the international community exerted some 
pressure on the Government to address these issues, internal pressures by the large population 
groups were stronger. The refugees and indigenous community were in a position to hold the 
leaders accountable and thus had the opportunity to influence the political survival of the 
Guatemala Government. The strength of the domestic pressures illuminates why the Government 
engaged in strategies to appease the large population groups; these strategies may not have been 
the Government’s preferred strategy but still helped them to retain office. The relationship types 
developed out of political motivation in response to the relative strength of the international 
community and the domestic pressures. 
Finally, on calls for justice and an end to impunity, the Guatemalan Government formed 
a competitive relationship with the NGOs. NGOs addressing justice issues from the Civil War 
posed a direct threat to the Government. Many government officials committed crimes during the 
Civil War but retained their positions of power. Anti-impunity measures, as advocated by the 
NGOs, would threaten these state officials’ power. The Government did implement some of the 
judicial reforms as dictated by the Peace Accords, yet it did little to attack the de facto obstacles 
that existed within society and that prevented justice from being obtained. Additionally, even as 
the NGOs began to gain traction on some anti-impunity cases, some in the Government put up a 
fight against these measures. The competitive relationship between the Guatemalan Government 
and the NGOs is a result of the desire of many powerful Government officials to protect 
themselves and their power.  
The relation types adopted by the Guatemalan government can be explained by political 
survival motivations. While addressing human rights issues, the Government sought to retain 
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their power by appeasing the NGOs and the international community who posed a threat to the 
financial resources of the country and who threatened the Government’s reputation 
internationally. To retain the power status quo while addressing refugees and indigenous peoples, 
the Government had to subdue the large population groups and their calls for change because 
these groups were potential threats to the Government’s power.  Finally, for some in the 
government, calls for justice were direct threats to the political survival of different government 
personnel. Thus, the government acted to retain the status quo of power by challenging anti-
impunity actions and measures. The Guatemalan Government acted in a way to preserve its 
power when it formed relationships with NGOs addressing different grievances and while 
implementing the Peace Accords. 
 
Methodology and Design: 
 
 The project uses a temporal frame that spans from 1990 (the beginning of the Peace 
Accords process) until 2015. This frame will allow for a study of the peace implementation stage 
in its entirety until the present. 
 This project will use evidence from state reports, international reports, NGO websites, 
and the truth commissions’ reports to gauge the type of relationship, the work done by the two 
groups, the outcome of the relationships, and the ongoing areas of concern. The post-conflict 
phase in Guatemala is still continuing to this day. Because of its recentness, there has not been an 
overarching analysis of the implementation phase of the Peace Accords. This project will 
construct an analysis regarding the relationships formed and their outcomes during the 
implementation phase as of 2015. 
 This project is a case study of Guatemala in the post-conflict phase. The case will be 
divided into three sections based on each issue: human rights, refugees and indigenous rights, 
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and justice. The first section will show a cooperative relationship, the second will show one of 
complementarity, and the third is one of competition. These sections will operate as three 
hypotheses to test the theory of political survival and relationships. These sections will all be 
examined under the same lens and will be subdivided as such: the content of the relevant Peace 
Agreement, actions of implementation by the state, the NGO community’s reaction, the current 
state of implementation of the Peace Accords, and finally, why this relationship type exists 
between the two groups.  
 The level of compliance of the two groups will be analyzed using the relationship theory. 
This theory postulated three different relationship types each that are formed based on similar or 
dissimilar goals and strategies. In cooperative relationships both the government and the NGOs 
share similar goals and will use similar strategies to achieve those goals. In relationships of 
complementarity the government and the NGOs have similar goals but will use different tactics 
to accomplish the goals. Finally, in competitive relationships the government and the NGOs have 
divergent goals and strategies.  The table below illustrates this theory. 
Table 2: Government and NGO Relationships25 
Type of relationship: Cooperative Complementarity Competitive 
Do the two groups 
share goals? 
 
Yes Yes No 
Do the two groups 
have similar 
strategies? 
Yes No No 
 
This project will examine the goals and strategies of the Guatemalan Government and of the 
NGOs in the post-conflict period to postulate why that particular relationship existed between 
these two entities.  
																																																								
25 (Najam, 2000, p. 384-387). 
	 29 
Chapters two through four examine specific relationships between the Guatemalan 
Government and NGOs on the greatest issues plaguing post-conflict Guatemala. Each chapter 
will use evidence from secondary sources to prove the existence of a certain relationship type 
and to demonstrate why the Government adopted this relationship type (i.e. how the relationship 
aided in the political survival of the state). The fifth and final chapter will expand on the 
implications of this research and point to further areas of study.  
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Chapter 2: Cooperation on Disseminating Human Rights Ideals and 
Memorializations 
 
Human rights violations were central to the crimes committed during the Guatemalan Civil 
War. In the aftermath of the conflict, civilians throughout the country had lingering human rights 
grievances specifically on the deeply rooted discrimination and inequality in the country. In the 
post-conflict phase there was a call for memory initiatives by victims and families of victims to 
memorialize those who suffered during the conflict and to ensure that a conflict of this intensity 
never occurred again. As Guatemala transitioned into democracy, human rights became a priority 
because a stable democracy cannot develop and progress unless its society is grounded in human 
rights norms.26 Human rights played a prominent role in the Guatemala Peace Accords with the 
creation of the Comprehensive Agreement of Human Rights. The Guatemalan Government and 
NGOs formed a cooperative relationship in implementing the Peace Agreement. This 
relationship reflected the shared goals and strategies of disseminating human rights throughout 
society. The cooperation grew out of the Guatemalan Government’s desire to appear to the 
international community and its engaged human rights activists as active in implementing Peace 
Accords as a way to retain their power. 
 
Content of the Peace Agreement  
 
The Government of Guatemala, the URNG, and the UN signed the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Human Rights in Mexico City on March 24, 1994. The Agreement established a 
series of commitments by the Guatemalan Government to reestablish human rights norms within 
the post-conflict society. The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights had nine major 																																																								
26 Democracies tend to be grounded in civil and political rights due to their ties to elections and voting. These rights 
are guaranteed through the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights that Guatemala has ratified.  
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goals. The commitments attempted to address the comprehensive category of human rights by 
addressing human rights norms in their broadest sense and then narrowing in on specific rights 
that were relevant to post-conflict Guatemala.  
Table 3: The Goals of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights27 
Goal Number Objective 
 
One A general commitment to human rights norms. This commitment was 
expanded in the subsequent goals and embraced by MINUGUA. The goal 
prioritized civil and political rights over cultural, economic and social rights.28  
 
Two A general commitment to strengthen institutions, such as the courts and the 
public prosecutors office, through funding and the support of autonomy to 
reflect human rights norms. Created a new position within the government 
titled The Human Rights Ombudsman, whom would ensure human rights 
ideals permeated throughout the Government and ultimately throughout the 
greater Guatemalan society 
 
Three A commitment against impunity especially in regard to potential efforts by 
supporters of the previous regime to create legislation to prevent prosecution 
and punishment of people responsible for human rights violations 
 
Four A commitment against any manifestation of illegal security forces or 
clandestine structures as well as a regulation of the right to bear arms to limit 
violence from recurring 
 
Five A guarantee regarding freedom of association and movement; a direct 
commitment to rights as defined in the Universal Declaration for Human 
Rights, Article 17 
 
Six Terminated forced military recruitment 
 
Seven Included safeguards and protection for individuals and organizations working 
on the protection of human rights 
 
Eight Provided compensation and/or assistance to victims of human rights violations 
from the Civil War 
 
Nine Created a guarantee of respect of human rights for those wounded, captured, or 
those who remained outside the conflict during the period of violence.  
 
																																																								
27 This information came from the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and Mersky’s Human Rights in 
Negotiating Peace Agreements: Guatemala 
 
28 They paid “particular attention to the rights to life, integrity and security of the person, to individual liberty, to due 
process, to freedom of expression, to freedom of movement, to freedom of association and to political rights” 
(Mersky, 2005, p. 9). 
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The Comprehensive Agreement also created the United Nations Verification Mission in 
Guatemala (MINUGUA) to aid in the implementation of the Peace Agreement. MINUGUA was 
deployed in 1994. MINUGUA’s mission was to ensure that no further human rights violations 
were taking place and to guarantee that the Guatemalan institutions were respecting human 
rights. MINUGUA acted as a deterrent to abuse (Stanley & Holiday, n.d., p. 30) because it was 
internationally backed and therefore acted as a monitoring mechanism. MINUGUA was 
originally tasked with individual case work, which had limited societal impact, but gradually 
expanded its work to include broader analyses of human rights issues in Guatemalan society 
which covered a myriad of issues, including “the justice sector, the prison system, children, and 
two reports each on exhumations and lynchings” (Mersky, 2005, p. 15). MINUGUA’s expanding 
role indicated its growing responsibility within Guatemalan society in relation to the 
implementation of human rights ideals. MINUGUA’s mandate ended in 2004 but international 
monitoring mechanisms within the country continue to the present.29  
The Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan NGOs implemented The Comprehensive 
Agreement on Human Rights through a cooperative relationship based on similar goals and 
strategies. The state adhered to their commitments from the Agreement via policy changes that 
the NGOs then utilized and expanded upon. 
 
Government Response to the Peace Accords 
 
The Comprehensive Agreement was rather effective since it was implemented 
immediately rather than the two-year delay (until 1996) that most of the other Guatemalan Peace 
Accords suffered as the opposing sides continued to debate particulars and as each agreement 
																																																								
29 MINUGUA is discussed more extensively in Chapter One and the international monitoring is discussed in the 
final section of this chapter. 
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sought political backing and funding (Mersky, 2005, p. 2). Because of how quickly the 
Comprehensive Agreement was put into effect, MINUGUA was swiftly deployed. The rapid 
deployment strengthened how quickly and effectively the Government acted on human rights 
since it received international financial support and was constrained by international monitoring. 
The Guatemalan Government in the years since the signing of the Peace Accords has 
implemented the ideals of the Comprehensive Agreement through four specific activities: new 
policies and reforms, education, memorializations, and reparations. 
The Government utilized a top down approach on human rights and initiated change 
through institutional and legal reforms. “In 1998, the Human Rights Commission of the UN 
concluded that there no longer existed an institutional policy by the state of violating human 
rights in Guatemala” (Salvesen, 2005, p. 12). The first four years of implementation showed 
major strides: human rights violations were significantly lower than they had been in the past and 
the signing of the entire Peace Accords created a sentiment of respect throughout the country. “A 
large part of Guatemala’s legal framework was revised to include explicit commitments to the 
protection and fulfillment of human rights – civil, political, economic, social, and cultural” 
(World Bank, n.d., p. 9). More specifically, in regards to implementing the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement’s recommendations on justice reforms, the Government established the Comisión de 
Seguimiento y Apoyo al Fortalecimiento de la Justicia to create dialogues on human rights and 
judicial reforms. 30  They also implemented a Justice Sector Modernization Law in 1997 
(Salvesen, 2005, p. 12).  The Government instituted a series of laws on equality beginning in 
2008 since equality is a pivotal aspect of human rights standards (“Replies of Guatemala to the 
																																																								
30 English translation: Commission for Monitoring and Supporting the Strengthening of Justice 
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List of Issues”, 2015, p. 6).31 The Guatemalan Government also created a series of new laws that 
had a human rights basis but were not directly related to the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Human Rights. More specifically, the state enacted laws on non-discrimination32, favorable work 
conditions33, protection of families, mothers and children34, the right to adequate standard of 
living35, and education36 (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2014). These policies 																																																								
31 The equality laws include: Decree No. 22-2008, Act on Femicide and Other Forms of Violence against Women; 
Decree No. 9-2009, Act against Sexual Violence, Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons; Decree No. 32-2010, Act 
on Healthy Motherhood; Decree No. 21-2009, Act on Criminal Jurisdiction in High-Risk Trials; The National Policy 
on the Comprehensive Advancement of Women and the Equal Opportunities Plan 2008–2023; The updated National 
Youth Policy 2012–2020; The National Policy on Violence and Crime Prevention, Public Safety and Peaceful 
Coexistence 2014–2034; The National Policy on Job Creation and Safe, Decent, Quality Employment; The Zero 
Hunger Pact, a macroeconomic policy on the needs of vulnerable groups; The National Policy for the Development 
of Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. The Equal Opportunities Plan 2008–2023 (National Policy for the 
Advancement and Development of Guatemalan Women); The National Plan for the Prevention and Elimination of 
Domestic Violence and Violence against Women and the Punishment of Offenders; Municipal pacts on equity, 
implemented in four departments through municipal women’s affairs offices; The Comprehensive Training Plan of 
the Office for the Defense of Indigenous Women; The Action Plan for the Reduction of Neonatal and Maternal 
Mortality and Improvement of Reproductive Health 2010–2015; The Institutional Strategic Plan on Gender and 
Ethnicity 2011–2015, which champions the rights of indigenous women; In 2011, the Supreme Electoral Court took 
measures to increase women’s participation in public; The establishment in 2013 of the Department for the 
Advancement of Women in Politics” (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2014). 
32 The Non Discrimination laws include: “The Budget Act; The National Policy on Coexistence and the Elimination 
of Racism and Racial Discrimination; The consideration of culture and multiculturalism in the recruitment and 
posting of new National Civil Police officers; The development by the National Institute of Statistics of a conceptual 
framework and guide for mainstreaming indicators related to gender and indigenous peoples; The National 
Development Plan entitled “K’atun: Our Guatemala 2032”, which focuses on indigenous peoples” (“Replies of 
Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2014, p. 6). 
 
33 The Right to just and favorable conditions of work policies include: “The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare 
has initiated the dialogue and ratification process for the ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011” (“Replies of 
Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2014, p. 13). 
 
34 The policies regarding the protection of the family, mothers and children include: “The Department against 
Violence, Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare devised a protocol 
for the identification of victims of dangerous child labor and the worst forms of child labor and human trafficking” 
(“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2014, p. 17). 
 
35 The policies in regard to the Right to an adequate standard of living include: “In June 2013, the Comprehensive 
Rural Development Cabinet was set up; Progress has been made towards achieving the eight Millennium 
Development Goals, as reflected in the favorable results with regard to 34 of the 54 indicators analyzed (63 per 
cent)” (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2014, p. 20). 
 
36 The policies in regard to the Right to education include: “the Ministry of Education has implemented measures 
such as school transport subsidies, scholarships and guaranteed free education. In addition, it runs the school meals 
program (linked to the Zero Hunger Pact), which has nationwide coverage and in 2013 provided meals to more than 
2.6 million child in pre-primary and primary school, thus contributing to better nutrition with a view to improving 
school performance; The Indigenous Development Fund promotes access by indigenous communities to technology, 
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include human rights goals as generally referenced in goal one of the Comprehensive Agreement 
on Human Rights. The political and institutional changes have created a de jure dissemination of 
human rights norms throughout the country. The Government’s policies were not geared 
necessarily at the persistent de facto issues. The Government’s top down approach began early 
within the implementation stage and has carried on throughout the 20+ years since the signing of 
the Peace Accords. 
The Government’s top down approach focused specifically on education via norm 
dissemination. The Government recognized the need for human rights norms and respect to 
permeate the country. The policy work of the Government had limited ground level impact. To 
supplement their own work, the Guatemalan state held two national events on discrimination and 
racism in 2013 and 2014 to educate the entire country on the root causes of the Civil War. 
Furthermore, the Government agreed to the importance of educating the population about the 
history of the Civil War. To signify its commitment to human rights and education, the 
Guatemalan Government created a separate Peace Agreement, the Agreement on the 
Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights (CEH), which extensively 
documented the human rights violations from the Civil War and doled out responsibility for the 
crimes, with a majority of the crimes having been committed by the Government.37 The fact that 
the Government permitted and established the CEH was indicative of their commitment on the 
human rights front. In 1999, President Arzu formally apologized for the role of the Government 
in the human rights abuses during the Civil War. This formal admission of responsibility was a 
major step forward for human rights  (Salvesen, 2005, p. 12). The CEH report and official 																																																																																																																																																																																		
virtual connectivity, inter-community communication and the right to technology and cyberspace through its Virtual 
Network Program” (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2014, p. 29). 
37 They released their report on February 25, 1999. Refer to chapter one for more information about this truth 
commission and their report.  
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admission of guilt illustrated the Government’s policy on human rights. The Government’s 
denouncement of its past actions indicated its stance: these actions had no place in the future 
society. The Government took steps to educate Guatemalan civilians on the root causes and on 
the history of the Civil War as a way to demonstrate its intention to encompass a multitude of 
human rights aspects in the post-conflict society. 
The Guatemalan Government took actions to address the grievances shared by a majority 
of civilians: how to commemorate and memorialize the victims of the Civil War. In response to 
the CEH’s release and findings, Guatemala’s Congress issued a legislative order in 2000 
establishing February 25th (the day the CEH released its report) as Victims of Violence Day/ Day 
of Dignity to annually honor those who suffered during the Civil War (Salvesen, 2005, p. 12). In 
2011, the Guatemalan Government under Colom aided the memorialization process by publicly 
acknowledging two revolutionaries from the Civil War who were killed by the repressive  
Government.38  This commemoration was significant because it stemmed from a coalition 
Government who was still struggling against the left wing members of the Government who 
opposed the contents of the Peace Accords and denied their wrongdoings. The dedication of a 
day and the public acknowledgement of the consequences of the Civil War demonstrated the 
Government’s active desire to instill broad human rights norms across society.  
In direct reference to goal eight of the Comprehensive Agreement, the Guatemalan 
Government took a series of actions to provide reparations to victims of the Civil War.39 In 2001, 
																																																								
38  “The commemoration was promoted by the Peace Secretariat (SEPAZ), the Presidential Human Rights 
Commission (COPREDEH), the National Reparations Program (PNR) and the Peace Archives with the approval of 
the families of Otto René Castillo and Nora Paiz. The goal was to acknowledge the two young revolutionaries, 
victims of intolerance and repression, to accept the responsibility of the government in the crimes, and to ask for 
pardon from the families of the victims. In a public event, in the presidential palace, President Alvaro Colom 
acknowledged the responsibility of the government in these crimes and officially asked for the families’ 
forgiveness” (Paniagua, Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012, p. 35). 
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President Portillo paid $1.8 million in compensation to survivors of families who suffered from 
the Dos Erres massacre of 1982 as a first step in implementing the Agreement’s goal (BBC, 
2012).40 In 2005, the Government created the National Reparations Program to more uniformly 
handle reparations. The Government’s actions on reparations were delayed in the post-conflict 
phase; this most likely was due to hard liners in the coalition Government resisting these actions 
and because the chronically weak state needed their financial resources for rebuilding after the 
Civil War and therefore delayed reparations until the state was more stable. Though delayed, the 
actions are indicative of the Government’s intention to implement the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Human Rights. 
The actions of the Guatemalan Government during the implementation phase of the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights reflect institutional changes through new positions 
and laws. The actions are also more symbolic with apologies and days of dedication. The actions 
in the twenty-two years indicate how the Guatemalan Government has been actively trying to 
disseminate human rights norms throughout the country. 
 
NGOs during the Implementation Stage 
 
The relationship between the Guatemalan Government and the NGOs was one of 
cooperation. The work by the NGOs parallels the actions of the Government. The two entities 
collaborated on creating education curriculums covering the facts of the war, anti-discrimination 
ideals, and norms of equality and the collaborated on holding memorializations.41  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
39 This topic will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four which discusses justice issues in post-conflict 
Guatemala. 
 
40 During this massacre, 200 people were murdered. Chapter four will discuss some of the actions for justice that has 
transpired in relation to this incident.  
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For the NGOs, education was grounded in ensuring the application of human rights in 
present and future Guatemalan society. There are four prominent NGOs who worked on 
education during the implementation stage. One of the most prominent human rights activists 
from Guatemala was Rigoberta Menchu, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. She created the 
Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation whose work included disseminating the Peace Accords to 
the rural population and covering a whole spectrum of post-conflict issues that had a human 
rights basis (“Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation”, n.d.).42 The Foundation’s human rights 
work, especially in education, empowerment, and activism supported the Government’s goals of 
societal human rights norm dissemination. Sons and Daughters for Identity and Justice Against 
Oblivion and Silence (HIJOS)43 was another NGO whose mission statement included active 
participation in the defense of human rights.44 Some of their work included raising awareness 
among Guatemalan youth about what happened during the conflict and illuminating how many 
of the same problems continue to persist, especially inequality and racism. Their ultimate goal 
was to create a society of educated youth who will never allow the human rights violations that 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
41 The work done by NGOs regarding reparations will be discussed in chapter four.  
 
42 Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation’s human rights work spanned across many sectors of Guatemalan society.  
The NGO trained educators to take a leadership role in indigenous communities, created Peace Jam to empower 
youth, sought justice within and outside of Guatemala for the Civil War’s human rights violations, created a 
Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources to protect the land and resources on indigenous lands, 
and, created the Political Formation program to aid in indigenous citizenship and political activism. An example of 
cooperation between the Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation and the Government not directly related to education 
but related to human rights work is the Foundation’s funds and credits program which corresponds to the 
Government’s creation of K’atun: Our Guatemala 2032 development program (this program will be discussed in 
chapter three) (“Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation”, n.d.). 
 
43 HIJOS began in Argentina in 1995 and then expanded to Guatemala in 1999 to raise awareness about those who 
disappeared during the bloody wars. Both organizations use public displays, graffiti, and demonstrations to raise 
awareness.  
 
44 The other two aspects of the HIJOS mission statement are to: “find the appropriate mechanisms to achieve trial 
and punishment to the military mass murderers and their accomplices and to keep alive the individual and collective 
memory of our parents, relatives, friends or comrades fallen in fight for a decent tomorrow” (“HIJOS Guatemala”, 
n.d.). 
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took place to occur again (“HIJOS Guatemala”, n.d.).45 This was a goal the Government tried to 
address in their education work as well. The Development Association of Indigenous 
Communities (ADICI) used international funding to develop educational materials with human 
rights goals and a true version of what happened during the war (Paniagua, Amezquita, & 
Martinez, 2012, p. 26). Like HIJOS, ADICI worked to disseminate victims’ perspectives of what 
happened during the dictatorships. A final prominent NGO that fought for human rights norms in 
society is the Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica (CIRMA) 46  which, 
beginning in 2004, created the national campaign “Why Are We the Way We Are?” which 
initiated a debate on racism and discrimination in the country (Paniagua, Amezquita, & 
Martinez, 2012, p. 31). This NGO-led dialogue was in line with the Government’s national 
events in 2013 and 2014 on discrimination by initiating conversations with the ultimate goals of 
equality and human rights norms. These NGOs worked to ensure human rights standards existed 
in present and future Guatemalan society. 
There are also several NGOs that addressed human rights by confronting the violations of the 
past and memorializing the victims of the violations. Memory initiatives are important to a 
grieving society to give some closure and hopefully make way for positive changes in the future. 
The Peace Accords did not mention honoring the victims of the war, however the work of the 
NGOs was beneficial to the Government since it was something the population wanted since a 
majority had suffered in some manner during the Civil War. It was a grievance that could have 
created a threat to the Government’s power had it not been addressed. Moreover, the 
Government was actively pursuing commemorations and memorializations with their own 																																																								
45 Some of this work is done through teaching the true history of the war, rather than the Government’s official 
story. This alternative stories gives a voice to the victims and civilians. By showing a true reality, HIJOS hopes to 
educate for change.  
 
46 English translation: Regional Research Center in Mesoamerica 
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activities. Once the violence subsided, the NGOs immediately began to address memorializations 
as a way to move on. The Association for the Integral Development of the Victims of the 
Violence of the Verapaces, Maya Achí (ADIVIMA) was one of the major NGOs who focused on 
memorializing the dead. Their activities included exhumations of clandestine cemeteries, proper 
burials, and memorials for the victims (“ADIVIMA”, n.d.).47 Their work brought dignity back to 
those who were murdered by giving closure and a future to the families of the victims. The desire 
to commemorate the dead was felt across the nation and acknowledged by other NGOs, such as 
CONAVIGUA and the Memory Ixhil Initiative.48 49 The memorializations provided closure to 
many who grieved and who suffered human rights violations. Closure, in turn, allowed for 
progress and for a country to move forward. Therefore, if the Government wanted the Peace 
Accords to be successful, they had to respect and encourage the work of the memory NGOs, 
often with direct support, as seen in the Government’s own commemoration activities. 
																																																								
47  ADIVIMA’S memorialization work also included “legal processes against those responsible for the human rights 
violations, legalization the heritage of the survivors, personal documentation of those affected, search and 
localization of those who disappeared during the violence, productive and sustainable projects for widows an 
orphans, rotating credit, housing and land acquisition projects, disclosing the information found in the Peace 
Accords and reports from the Truth Commission and REMHI to the affected on their rights and obligations in order 
to influence state affairs” (“ADIVIMA”, n.d.). Like many of the listed NGOs, ADIVIMA’s work ranged across a 
number of issues. ADIVIMA’s other programs included attention to other focal points of universal human rights 
norms, namely education and equality: they provided education development programs in rural areas and gave 
special concern to females in the machismo Guatemalan society (“ADIVIMA”, n.d.). 
 
48 The Coordinator of Guatemalan Widows (CONAVIGUA) constructed a number of monuments throughout the 
country that listed the names of victims of the conflict (Paniagua, Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012, p. 16).   
 
49 The Reconstruction of the Ixhil Historical Memory initiative was created in 2005. It was an initiative led by 
indigenous rural citizens who felt a need to document their “history of survival in the mountains, the repression 
carried out by the army against their communities during the 1980s, and the long history of oppression and 
resistance of the Ixhil people in the broader sense from their origins to the present day” (Paniagua, Amezquita, & 
Martinez, 2012, p. 20). 60-80 people participated in the initiative and led to the writing of the book in 2006 by 
Alfonso Huet titled Nos salvó la sagrada selva: la memoria de veinte comunidades Q ́eqchi ́es que sobrevivieron al 
genocidio (Paniagua, Amezquita, & Martinez, 2012).  
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Cooperative Relationship 
 
The commitments from the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights have been and 
continue to be worked on through cooperation between the Guatemalan Government and the 
human rights NGOs. The Guatemalan Government’s actions on implementing the 
Comprehensive Agreement were grounded in institutional changes, new policies, programs and 
positions, and public acknowledgement of responsibility. To support the top down Government’s 
approach, the NGO’s sought to supplement policies with development projects, education 
efforts, and memorializations. The NGO’s acted in ways that enhanced the Government’s 
actions. The work of the two often interacted; the two entities have often jointly engaged in 
human rights dialogues and commemoration/ memorialization events. As noted in the literature 
review on relationships, cooperation includes three activities to which both sides can benefit 
from: information sharing, resource sharing, and joint actions. In Guatemala, the two entities 
shared information regarding history and facts, they shared resources via laws and development 
projects, and they jointly acted on dialogues and memorializations. The cooperative relationship 
has helped the country move into a democratic state beginning to be grounded in human rights 
ideals.  
 
Current State of the Peace Accord Implementation 
 
 The work done by NGOs regarding human rights education and memorializations was in 
line with what the Guatemala Government was trying to achieve in the aftermath of the Peace 
Accords. The Guatemalan state took the lead on disseminating their goals as evidenced by the 
policies they adopted. The NGOs supplemented the policies with their own work, emphasizing 
the education and memorialization goals. This collaborative work led to some positive changes 
in the country in regard to human rights. The fact that human rights violations are no longer 
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considered acceptable within governmental policy was a positive step (Salvesen, 2002, 14). In 
addition to the multitude of policy changes and new laws implemented, there was “a total of 
8,761 workshops [for government actors, social activists, and civilians] held nationwide between 
2006 and 2014 on civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, the rights of indigenous 
peoples and national and international human rights protection mechanisms for the benefit of 
indigenous authorities and community leaders” (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 
2014, p. 3). Each and every workshop was a positive step in regards to progress for human rights 
because it created conversations on human rights ideals. Additionally, the Comprehensive 
Agreement as a document has be used and cited by the Government to justify their actions and 
has given language to the NGOs to legitimize their actions. The Comprehensive Agreement on 
Human Rights initiated policy changes, norm dissemination, and memorializations, and gave 
legitimacy to post-conflict actions.  
While there have been positive changes in post-conflict Guatemala, there are several human 
rights issues that still persist. In regards to issues that are directly tied to the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Human Rights, a significant lingering problem is the discrimination and biases 
that exist in post-conflict Guatemalan society. The International Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination has continually published concerns about the deeply rooted racism that 
exists in everyday social life and that persists politically and institutionally in Guatemala.50 The 
Committee notes that some of the legislation, which was intended to eliminate discrimination 
and inequality within the country, has been implemented, but de facto obstacles still persist and 
prevent the policies from successful realization (“Compilación de Observaciones Finales”, 2006, 
p. 281). Guatemala has a strong legal basis in regard to the right to education with a multitude of 																																																								
50 In 2011 there were 79 cases presented before the courts on issues of discrimination and biases in society, and only 
one of the 79 cases was tried (“Compilación de Observaciones Finales”, 2006, p. 285). 
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laws and policies. However, in spite of these laws, the use of human rights terminology within 
the education sector is limited and the curriculum still contains discriminatory stereotypes (Otto, 
2008, p. 14). Furthermore, in regards to memorialization, the state has failed to address a major 
issue: the fate of the forced disappeared persons from the Civil War.51 The Government has not 
created a National Commission of Inquiry to address the whereabouts of the disappeared nor has 
it created a centralized registry of disappeared persons (“Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee”, 2008, p. 6). The continuing discrimination and the lack of information 
regarding the fate of the disappeared leaves human rights grievances ever-present in society.   
By far the most serious problem in post-conflict Guatemala is the attacks on human rights 
defenders. These attacks are human rights violations in themselves but they are also preventing 
NGOs from addressing the myriad of human rights issues in post-conflict society. This is an 
issue across the board for NGOs in Guatemala. The situation is so dire that in 2001, international 
observers labeled Guatemala as suffering a “human rights meltdown” and the violent situation 
persists (Amnesty International, 2002, p. 5).52 The rates of attack are high and have been 
increasing since the early 2000s to the present:  “the NGO Guatemalan Human Rights Defenders 
Protection Unit (UDEFEGUA) […] reported 622 attacks against human rights defenders through 
November [2013], compared with 326 attacks in 2012” (“Guatemala 2013 Human Rights 
Report”, 2013, p. 15). The attacks range from threats to physical attacks on NGOs working in 																																																								
51 In the 2000s a series of exhumations took place which helped lead to information on the disappeared. However, 
most of the actions on exhumations were initiated by NGOs rather then the Government. The Government, 
particularly the army, has withheld information that could lead to more information. The classified documents will 
be discussed to a greater extent in Chapter Four. Regardless of the exhumations, there has not been a coordinated 
Government effort to address this major human rights violation nor has there been an effort to address and console 
the victims’ loved ones who seek more information.  
 
52 The human rights violations discussed in this paragraph are targeting NGOs, activists, and as Chapter Four will 
discuss, witnesses/ justice officials. These violations are on the rise. However, as this section states, generally, 
Guatemala’s human rights violations have decreased from what they were during the Civil War. Attacks during the 
Civil War were broader reaching and targeted large sectors of society (i.e. the indigenous population).  The current 
attacks focus on activists. The current attacks however are escalating and leading to an increase of human rights 
violations in post-conflict Guatemala.  
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post-conflict Guatemala.53 The Government has sought to address these issues with creation of 
The Unit for the Analysis of Attacks against Human Rights Defenders54 and the Coordination 
Unit for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Justice Administrators and Operators, 
Journalists and Social Communicators. However, it is not enough. The attacks on those 
defending human rights, those testifying in human rights cases, and those doing ground level 
work is disturbing and indicates that the Guatemalan Government has much work to do in its 
post-conflict society: it needs to continue to address grievances from the conflict but also address 
current human rights violations. 
 The persisting injustices and the obstacles to addressing these grievances are significant 
aspects of the post-conflict phase in Guatemala. Though the issues are substantial, the 
cooperative relationship of the Government and the NGOs provides the best prospects for a 
future Guatemalan society grounded in human rights norms. 
																																																								
53 There have been a series of attacks on well-known human rights groups and activists. “The staff of the Fundación 
Rigoberta Menchú received death threats after filing suit in Spain against a number of former Guatemalan officials 
for genocide […] Other Guatemalan NGOs, including the indigenous rights group Comité de Unidad Campesina 
(CUC), Peasants’ Unity Committee, who joined the Menchú writ, also reported threats and harassment.” 
Additionally, “threats were sent to Miguel Angel Albizures, a contributor to the newspaper El Periódico and a 
prominent member of the NGO umbrella group, the Alianza contra la Impunidad; in August 2000, Celso Balán, a 
representative of the Centro de Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos was seized by two men; […] “In September 
2000 the headquarters of FAMDEGUA were raided; […] Repeated attacks upon CEIBAS eventually forced it to 
stop working in Guatemala and reorganize abroad. Staff members of the Fundación de Antropología Forense de 
Guatemala (FAFG) were attacked in October 2000; The office of the Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios 
(AEU), Students Association, was broken into; […] The offices of the Asociación de Mujeres Vamos Adelante were 
raided in October 2000 by four armed men; […] Members of the Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala 
(CONAVIGUA) received death threats because of their efforts to bring a former military commissioner to justice for 
repeated rapes; […] Members of the Grupo de Apoyo Mútuo (GAM) reported death threats and surveillance in 
November and December 2000; […] Staff of the Fundación Myrna Mack, Myrna Mack Foundation,, and members 
of a REMHI team disseminating conclusions of the REMHI report in Chimaltenango reported threats in February 
2001 (Amnesty International, 2002, p. 14). 
 
54 “The Unit for the Analysis of Attacks against Human Rights Defenders does not protect human rights defenders. 
Its main function is to examine, in context, the pattern of attacks against this group” (“Replies from the Government 
of Guatemala”, 2011, p. 26) and therefore is not a directly useful organization for protecting the human rights 
activists.  
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Why Cooperation? 
 
The Guatemalan Government entered into a cooperative relationship with the 
Guatemalan NGOs as a way to protect their political power. This relationship stemmed from the 
NGO’s involvement in the Peace Accords process and international pressure. 
The Guatemalan Government did not have to search high and low to form a cooperative 
relationship with the NGOs; it was already available. The Peace Accords included extensive 
participatory mechanisms. In 1994, the Civil Society Association (ASC) was established to 
represent civil societies opinions and grievances during the Peace Accord process (Salvesen, 
2002, p. 25). The Peace Accords process also produced dozens of commissions that created 
debates and dialogues among the Government and civil society (Stanley & Holiday, n.d., p. 5). 
NGOs were active in both because many of the NGOs were composed of activists and those who 
suffered during the Civil War all who sought to see improvements for human rights in post-
conflict society. Thus, NGOs already were forming a cooperative relationship with the 
Government prior to the implementation phase and it was easier for the Government to maintain 
the camaraderie. Moreover, since the NGOs had been involved in the Peace Accords process, 
they also had a higher stake in the implementation phase and could have become less cooperative 
had the Government not been active in the implementation. Therefore, the cooperative 
relationship proved beneficial to both entities. 
The other major reason the Government and the NGOs cooperated is due to international 
presence. The international community played two roles: provision of financial support and 
monitoring. “By accepting an unprecedented level of international scrutiny into Guatemalan 
domestic affairs, the Government was able to demonstrate its commitment to fundamental 
change in relation to human rights” (Arnault, 2006, p.16). Guatemala wanted to mark its progress 
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in democratization and in moving past their long, violent conflict. Thus, the Government allowed 
the international community to play an important role in supporting the cooperative relationship 
because the state was compelled to apply human rights norms under international financial 
obligations and international watchdog pressures. 
The international community provided the guarantee of much needed financial resources. 
The funding came with the stipulation of actual implementation of the Peace Accords. It was in 
the state’s best interest to do everything it could, including working with NGOs, to ensure they 
received the funding. Prior to the signing of the Peace Accords, “the United States in 1990 began 
to pressure for human rights improvements, and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank 
and the European Parliament began to condition aid on progress in human rights” (Stanley & 
Holiday, n.d., p.15). The Guatemalan state needed to show progress in implementing the 
Comprehensive Agreement and on instilling human rights ideals in order to maintain the status 
quo of aid. As the Peace Accords process proceeded, the chronically weak Guatemalan State was 
promised money to strengthen their political institutions; there was a promise of  $1.9 billion by 
international donors (Stanley & Holiday, n.d., p. 12).55 For a government to survive, it needs 
funding. Thus out of a political survival motivation, the Guatemalan Government utilized the 
resources available to them: their resources included NGOs whom could supplement the 
Government’s actions. For a Government to retain power, it needs to be seen as working to 
improve society, therefore as the Guatemalan Government implemented new policies and 
programs in response to the Peace Accords, they needed resources to efficiently operate them. 
																																																								
55 “The international donor community (25 countries and 22 international bodies) promised to fund US$ 1.9 billion 
for Guatemala’s reconstruction efforts between 1997 and 2000, and the actual contributions made – US$ 2.4 billion 
for the period 1996–99 – even exceeded their promises” (Salvesen, 2002, p. 29). 
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Accordingly, as a way to maintain political power nationally, the Government needed to respond 
to the international pressure and pursued a political platform composed of human rights norms. 
The international community played another major role in the implementation of the 
Peace Accords: monitoring. MINUGUA was the result of direct international involvement. 
MINUGUA carried out the verification and institution building activities that aided the 
Government and NGO relationship. MINUGUA’s mandate expired in 2004 but the international 
community continued its direct involvement with the establishment of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in 2005 that continues to monitor the human rights concerns 
within the country by issuing reports and recommendations (“Guatemala’s Crippled Peace 
Agreement”, 2011).  The international community also played a less direct role in Guatemala as 
watchdogs that vocalized Guatemala’s human rights issues. Major players include the ‘Group of 
Friends’ (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Spain, Norway and the United States), the Inter-
American Development Bank (Salvesen, 2002, p. 29), and international NGOs such as the 
Washington Office on Latin America, Amnesty International Americas Watch, and Human 
Rights Watch (Mersky, 2005, p. 7). These countries, institutions, and NGOs were aware of the 
post-conflict situation in Guatemala and applied pressure (through investigations, reports, media, 
and naming and shaming) to ensure change. As a way to retain their power and status 
internationally, the Guatemalan Government acted progressively on human rights.  
The Guatemalan Government acted in a way to strengthen its position politically. By 
working cooperatively with NGOs, the Government showed its intent to address human rights 
issues and implement the Peace Agreement. This willingness was vital in international eyes and 
in the eyes of civilians with numerous grievances. The Government’s resolve developed out of a 
political survival motivation to retain their power in post-conflict Guatemala. 
	 48 
Chapter 3: Relationship of Complementarity on Refugees and 
Indigenous Rights 
 
 The Guatemalan Civil War left one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 
“400,000 exiled in Mexico, Belize, Honduras, Costa Rica, and the US” (REMHI, 1999, p. 55). 56 
The Guatemalan refugees were addressed relatively quickly during the Peace Accords with The 
Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict.57 The 
refugees’ return was a particular concern to the success of the Peace Accords process and to the 
sustainability of the newly democratizing state.58 A majority of the refugees were of Mayan 
descent, therefore the grievances of the refugees morphed into grievances of the indigenous 
populations. Thus, refugee repatriation and indigenous rights are tied together. These two 
populations constituted a majority within Guatemala’s population. As this chapter will explore, 
the Guatemalan Government operated with Guatemalan NGOs in a relationship of 
complementarity in reaction to the voices and demands of the large population groups. 
Complementarity is based on work to achieve the same goal through different strategies, namely 
a government’s top down approach complemented by the NGO’s bottom up approach. This 
chapter will demonstrate that when addressing refugees, the relationship arose due competing 
repatriation plans resulting in two different strategies. When addressing indigenous rights, 
																																																								
56 This number is up to some debate. The data is not that precise because the country was in war. One example of the 
discrepancy is the difference between the actual numbers of uprooted persons and how many the UNCHR registered 
as official refugees: “In flight from a vicious civil war in the early 1980s, 150,000 to 200,000 Guatemalans crossed 
over to Mexico; some 46,000 were eventually registered by UNHCR as refugees” (Jamal, 2000, p. 5). Other data 
discrepancies include the number of refugees recognized by a variety of institutions and NGOs, varying from 40,000 
up to 400,000. 
 
57  Of note, the Guatemalan refugees were part of the Accords but the IDPs were largely ignored and forgotten in the 
Peace Accords Process. This population is still a lingering consequence of the Civil War.  
 
58 As discussed in Chapter One’s literature review on peace accords: refugees, due to their large population and 
necessity for funding, require explicit attention during peace accords process.  
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indigenous activism resulted in significant ground level work that complemented Government 
policies.  
Refugees had their own set of grievances while in exile, these included: homelessness, 
poverty, fear, negative aspects of living in refugee camps, and a loss of identity.59 Refugees 
when returning then suffered from land loss, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
reestablishing communities, and economic and productive reintegration (De Rivero, 2001, p. 
10).60 Many of the repatriated persons unfortunately faced further issues because of their Mayan 
identity. “83.3% of the crimes during the war were suffered by members of the Mayan people, 
who also suffered extreme acts of cruelty and violence that reached to establish the crimes as 
genocide” (Rostica, 2007, p. 76). During the Civil War, the cultural rights of the Mayan were 
destroyed; this devastation included the repression of language and dress, the physical 
annihilation of “ceremonial centers, sacred places and cultural symbols” (Tomuschat, Lux de 
Coti & Tojo, 1999, p. 35), and the repression of social and religious life, structures, norms, and 
traditions. The NGOs tackling indigenous rights concerns were dealing with the historical issues 
of inequality and exclusionary practices that permeated all aspects of society and still continues 
to this day while also addressing the human rights violations that occurred during the Civil War. 
The Peace Accords addressed the grievances of both the refugees and the indigenous 
populations. 
																																																								
59 In relation to identity: “Many people felt that they had forfeited their original identity by not remaining in their 
community. Others, in contrast, acquired a new identity based on their positive experience in their receiving 
community or their involvement in different movements” (REMHI, 1999, p. 61). This lack of identity can lead to 
changed individuals and changed communities when the refuges do repatriate.  
 
60 Many resettled communities are still dependent on outside (foreign and international) aid and subsistence farming. 
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Content of the Peace Agreements 
 
 The Peace accords yielded two agreements of relevance to this chapter: The Agreement 
on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict and The Agreement 
on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 The Government of Guatemala, The URNG, and the UN signed the Agreement on the 
Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict on June 17th, 1994 in Oslo. 
The deliberations for this Peace Agreement began in 1992 when the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted and publicized the refugee situation. Under 
this UNHCR pressure, the parties to the Accords agreed to address the issues the refugee 
population was facing while in exile and would confront upon returning to Guatemala.61 Based 
on these areas of concern, the parties generated specific topics to address during repatriation, 
these included: full respect for human rights, special protections for women and children who 
were particularly affected and vulnerable, respect for indigenous rights, emphasis on the security 
of those resettled,62 and attention to the lack of personal documentation.63 As the deliberations 
proceeded, the parties established five goals for a comprehensive resettlement strategy. The goals 
were: to ensure that the refugee population would enjoy all their fundamental rights, to 
reintegrate the uprooted population, to fight poverty64, to strengthen the democratization of state 
																																																								
61 Refer to the introduction of this chapter, second paragraph, to understand the areas of concern for the refugees 
 
62 The security concerns addressed the physical safety of the repatriated: “the Parties recognize the urgent need to 
remove all types of mines or explosive devices buried or abandoned in these areas” (“Agreement on Resettlement of 
Population Groups”, 1994). 
 
63 “The lack of personal documentation for the majority of the uprooted population groups increases their 
vulnerability and limits their access to basic services and the enjoyment of their civil and political rights” 
(“Agreement on Resettlement of Population Groups”, 1994). 
 
64 Poverty had a particularly large effect on the areas where the populations were uprooted and where they were 
resettled 
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structures,65 and to promote genuine reconciliation66 (“Agreement on Resettlement of Population 
Groups”, 1994). The Agreement arose out of actions by the Government and NGOs on 
repatriation plans, which will be discussed more extensively in the next section. The Agreement 
on the Uprooted Populations was one of the first Agreements put into effect after the end of the 
Civil War because of the pressing need to address the refugee population.  
 The Government of Guatemala, the URNG, and the UN signed The Agreement on The 
Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples on March 31, 1995 in Mexico City. This Agreement 
was the first of its type across Latin America and was different than the other Peace Accords 
from Guatemala in that it acknowledged a root cause of the war: discrimination. The Peace 
Agreement stated: “the indigenous peoples have been particularly subject to de facto levels of 
discrimination, exploitation and injustice, on account of their origin, culture and language” 
(“Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 1995).67 The Peace Agreement 
was divided into four chapters; table four will illustrate the content of each chapter. 
																																																								
65 The strengthening of democratic structures is important to ensure that the constitutional rights of the resettled 
populations are respected at all levels of governance.  
 
66 The promotion of genuine reconciliation is vital to instilling a culture of peace in the resettlement areas. The 
reconciliation can also be beneficial on a national level with broader political participation, tolerance and respect.   
67  The full script of the Peace Accord preamble where discrimination and inequality is noted is as follows: “That the 
indigenous peoples have been particularly subject to de facto levels of discrimination, exploitation and injustice, on 
account of their origin, culture and language and that, like many other sectors of the national community, they have 
to endure unequal and unjust treatment and conditions on account of their economic and social status; That this 
historical reality has affected and continues to affect these peoples profoundly, denying them the full exercise of 
their rights and political participation, and hampering the configuration of a national unity which should adequately 
reflect the rich and diversified physiognomy of Guatemala with its wealth of values; That until this problem 
affecting Guatemalan society is resolved, its economic, political, social and cultural potential will never be able to 
develop fully and neither will it be able to take the place in the community of nations due to it by virtue of its 
ancient history and the spiritual grandeur of its people” (“Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples”, 1995). 
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Table 4: Chapter Content of the Agreement on Indigenous Rights68 
Chapter Number Content 
One The identity of the indigenous people69 
 
Two The struggle against discrimination70 (specifically the rights of indigenous women71) 
 
Three Cultural rights (specifically language72, names, spirituality73, ceremonial centers74, 
the use of indigenous dress75, education reform76, and mass media77) 
 
Four Civil, political, social, and economic rights of indigenous populations 
 																																																								
68 The information in the table comes from the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples  
 
69 “Recognition of the identity of the indigenous peoples is fundamental to the construction of a national unity based on respect 
for and the exercise of political, cultural, economic and spiritual rights of all Guatemalans”  
 
70 The Government promised four actions in hopes of eliminating discrimination, these include that the Government will: “(a) 
Promote in the Guatemalan Congress, the classification of ethnic discrimination as a criminal offence; (b) Promote a review by 
the Guatemalan Congress of existing legislation with a view to abolishing any law that could have discriminatory implications for 
the indigenous peoples; (c) Widely disseminate information on the rights of the indigenous peoples through education, the 
communications media and through other channels; and (d) Promote the effective protection of such rights”  
 
71  Indigenous women face double discrimination for being women and indigenous, thus they deserve special protections. The 
Government promised to: “ (a) Promote legislation to classify sexual harassment as a criminal offence […](b) Establish an Office 
for the Defense of Indigenous Women’s Rights […]; and (c) Promote the dissemination and faithful implementation of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women”  
 
72  To address the language rights of the indigenous populations, the Government agreed to these measures: “(a) Promote a 
constitutional reform calling for the listing of all languages existing in Guatemala which the State is constitutionally required to 
recognize, respect and promote; (b) Promote the use of all indigenous languages in the educational system (c) Promote the use of 
the languages of the indigenous people when providing State social services at the community level; (d) Inform indigenous 
communities, in their own languages in keeping with the traditions of the indigenous peoples and by adequate means, of their 
rights, obligations and opportunities in various areas of national life. (e) Promote programs for the training of bilingual judges 
and court interpreters from and into indigenous languages; (f) Enhance the status of indigenous languages (g) Promote the 
granting of official status to indigenous languages”  
 
73  “The Government undertakes to secure respect for the exercise of this spirituality in all its manifestations, and particularly for 
the right to practice it, both in public and in private by means of education, worship and observance.  […]  The Government shall 
promote, in the Guatemalan Congress, the reform of article 66 of the Constitution to stipulate that the State recognizes, respects 
and protects the various forms of spirituality practiced by the Maya, Garifuna and Xinca peoples”  
 
74 “According to the Guatemalan Constitution, temples and ceremonial centers of archaeological value constitute part of the 
national cultural heritage.  As such, they are the property of the State and must be protected”  
 
75 “The constitutional right to wear indigenous dress must be respected and guaranteed in all areas of national life” 
 
76 The Accords recognized that education is a major aspect in the development of cultural values and knowledge. Thus, the 
Government agreed to: “(a) Decentralize and regionalize the system in order to adapt it to linguistic and cultural needs and 
specific features; (b) Give communities and families, which are a source of education, an active role in determining curricula and 
the school calendar (c) Incorporate the educational concepts of the Maya and other indigenous peoples, particularly in the 
philosophical, scientific, artistic, pedagogical, historical, linguistic and socio-political areas, as part of the overall reform of the 
educational system; (d) Expand and promote intercultural bilingual education and place emphasis on the study and knowledge of 
indigenous languages at all educational levels;(e) Promote improvements in the socio-economic living conditions of communities 
by developing the values, content and methods of their culture, technological innovations and the ethical principle of protection 
of the environment; (f) Include in educational syllabuses programs that strengthen national unity through respect for cultural 
diversity; (g) Recruit and train indigenous bilingual teachers and technical and administrative officials to develop education in 
their communities […]; (h) Pursue the effective realization of the constitutional right to education […];Increase the budget of the 
Ministry of Education”  
 
77 “Media play[s] a paramount role in the defense, development and transmittal of cultural values and knowledge. It is the 
responsibility not only of the Government but also of all those working in and involved with the news media to promote respect 
for indigenous cultures, the dissemination of such cultures, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination”  
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The Peace Agreement on Indigenous Rights created five commissions of mixed composition 
who worked to ensure active indigenous representation and inclusion while simultaneously 
addressing major grievances specific to these communities.78 The Agreement gave verification 
power to MINUGUA on addressing the human rights issues inherently tied to indigenous rights. 
The Agreement was comprehensive in its coverage of indigenous rights on an individual level, 
cultural level, and national level.  
 
Actions by the Guatemalan Government and NGOs 
 
To understand the relationship of complementarity established between the Government 
of Guatemala and the Guatemalan NGOs while addressing refugees and the rights of indigenous 
peoples, it is important to analyze them separately. The following subsections will examine the 
actions of the entities during the post-conflict phase.  
 
The Government and NGOs on Addressing Refugee Populations  
 
The Guatemalan refugee population’s reintegration and resettlement should be 
historically examined in order to grasp how the Guatemalan Government and the NGOs 
interacted and complemented one another’s actions.  
In 1987, before the Civil War had ended, the UNHCR, the Guatemalan Government, and 
the Mexican Government signed a tripartite Agreement to address the refugee situation through a 
repatriation plan.79 This repatriation plan monitored by the still repressive Guatemalan army was 
																																																								
78 “Three of these [were] composed of government and indigenous representatives and tasked to develop specific 
proposals on educational reform, political reform and participation, and indigenous peoples’ land rights. The other two, 
not necessarily of mixed composition, [were] to address the granting of official status for indigenous languages and the 
definition and preservation of sacred areas” (Costello et al., 1997, p. 267). 
 
79 Mexico was part of this agreement because the vast majority of Guatemalan Refugees took refuge in Mexico 
during the Civil War and therefore the fate of the refugees was important to the Mexican Government. 
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intended to be a “process to restore the refugee’s obedience to the state” (Long, 2007). Refugees 
received amnesty as they reentered the country but were then resettled into model villages and 
development poles that suffered under the military who imposed their counter-insurgency 
doctrine upon the population of refugees (De Rivero, 2001, p. 9).80 Unsurprisingly, the refugees 
largely rejected this government sponsored repatriation strategy stating that the program did not 
offer short term security nor long term stability for the uprooted populations; only 6,000 refugees 
of the 400,000 utilized this option (Long, 2007, p. 4). Dissatisfied with the Guatemalan 
Government’s repatriation attempt, the refugees mobilized and formed their own political group 
to influence their resettlement; this group was called Permanent Commissions (CCPP).81 The 
active participation by refugees was unprecedented and led to the formation of NGOs advocating 
for refugees rights upon return. The political awakening stemmed from the refugees’ experiences 
while in exile with democracy and liberal human rights ideals through international connections 
and activists, like Rigoberta Menchu (who will be discussed later on) (Long, 2007, p. 4). The 
way that the CCPP developed and demanded their own rights included the refugees “building 
networks of support outside state control and citing international law and human rights theory as 
mechanisms limiting state power, while simultaneously building upon community and collective 
organization to promote local development” (Long, 2007, p. 8). The CCPP became a political 
group who, rather than allowing repatriation to be a reassertion of state control on its citizens, 
became active agents that asserted their own autonomy and needs. The CCPP negotiated an 
agreement (signed in 1992) that specified certain conditions for the refugees’ return; these 
																																																								
80 Refer to Chapter One: Background information for information about the Development Poles 
 
81 Rigoberta Menchu, human rights activists and recipient of the Nobel Peace prize, was active in mobilization of the 
refugees. As a refugee herself, she internationalized the plight and helped increase the development of the skills of 
the refugees to enter into the government negotiations via the CCPP. Menchu’s influence on both refugees and 
indigenous rights will be discussed more extensively later in this chapter.  
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included safety concerns, the need for a comprehensive reintegration program, 82  and a 
guaranteed access to land and credit (De Rivero, 2001, p. 9). In 1993, the first round of CCPP 
refugees (about 2,500) returned to Guatemala (Long, 2007, p. 4) and by 1999, the last of the 
refugees had been repatriated (Jamal, 2000, p. 1). 83  The 1994 Peace Agreement on the 
Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict reflected the CCPP 
negotiations through a direct reference in the Agreement: “Uprooted population groups shall 
participate in decision-making concerning the design, implementation and supervision of the 
comprehensive resettlement strategy and its specific projects” (“Agreement on Resettlement of 
Population Groups”, 1994). The Agreement on Uprooted Populations was intended to 
supplement the work of the CCPP and address the needs of resettled populations.  
The relationship between the Guatemalan Government and the NGOs (the CCPP was 
made up of social activists and can be considered a NGO) is unique. The Government tried to 
pursue their own strategy but met resistance from the more than 400,000 refugees. Thus, the 
Government formed a relationship of complementarity with the refugees. The main goal was to 
repatriate the uprooted populations. The realization of this goal was dependent on satisfying the 
needs of all involved parties. The Government sought this relationship type as a way to placate 
all relevant parties and to retain political power in spite of the massive population of refugees 
demanding improved repatriation policies. The Government sought to control the idea that 
“returnees should [...] be viewed as potential agents of change, rather than objects of charity” 
(Jamal, 2000, p. 2). As agents of change, these refugees could pose a threat to the Government’s 
																																																								
82 More specifically, this program addressed the six main concerns by the refugees: the right of a refugee to decide 
when, how and where to return, the right of refugees to land, freedom of association, right to life, security and 
integrity, international support, and freedom of movement.   
 
83 Only about 20,000 refugees of the approximately 400,000 returned to Guatemala. The rest resettled elsewhere.  
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political plans and power. The Government addressed and contained these potential threats by 
complying with the refugees’ demands. 
The refugees were active within the CCPP and on addressing other issues surrounding 
their resettlement. Returnees were engaged in promoting the implementation of the Peace 
Accords. Female refugees also began to develop their own women’s organizations to encourage 
political participation and gender equality (De Rivero, 2001, p. 9). The way that the returnees 
confronted the Guatemalan Government on repatriation efforts enabled them to confront the 
state’s failings on other issues. The Coordination of NGOs and Cooperatives (CONGCOOP) was 
active during the period of settlement of the refugees. It arose in 1992 to aid in the collective 
return of refugees by vocalizing and developing projects based on the needs and rights of the 
uprooted populations. Once the CCPP and the Guatemalan Government established their 
agreement and refugees began to resettle, CONGCOOP, now made up of some resettled citizens 
(as well as indigenous activists), used their prior strategies to tackle new topics. Beginning in 
1996, CONGCOOP’s priorities shifted to include: compliance with the Peace Accords,84 
increasing rural public political participation,85 developing rural community capacities,86 and 
addressing water and the environment (“CONGCOOP”, n.d.).87 The shift by CONGCOOP to 
address a greater range of issues revealed the empowerment that was felt among resettled 
populations. This expanded coverage also demonstrated the way that resettled activists were 
																																																								
84 CONGCOOP was mainly focused on “the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation 
(ASESA), with regard to access to land, economic and social rights” (“CONGCOOP”, n.d.).  
 
85 CONGCOOPs strategy included increasing gender and cultural participation across local, regional, national and 
international levels of politics (“CONGCOOP”, n.d.). 
 
86 CONGCOOP aimed to increase living standards in rural populations, with special emphasis on land and product 
diversification 
 
87 CONGCOOP aimed to protect and raise awareness about environmental threats and the threat of privatization of 
public services and natural resources  
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finding new ways to remain politically relevant and active in post-conflict Guatemala. The 
refugees gained, both physically by returning, but also through empowerment, from their 
interactions with the Government on refugee resettlement. The Guatemalan Government also 
gained politically through this interaction by addressing the refugee crisis that had garnered 
international attention and by alleviating the pressure that had posed a threat to their power. 
 
The Government and NGOs on Indigenous Rights 
 
 The actions of the Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan NGOs can be more clearly 
divided when looking at indigenous rights. The two entities were both working towards a mutual 
goal but their strategies diverged, thus forming a relationship of complementarity.  
 
The Guatemalan Government’s Actions on Indigenous Rights 
 
During the implementation stage of The Agreement on The Identity and Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, the Guatemalan Government acted in compliance with the requirements of 
the Agreement. The main governmental actions can be separated into three general categories: 
general discrimination, justice, and education. 
On general discrimination issues, the Guatemalan Government sought to eliminate 
discrimination within its policies, programs, and sectors. The Government established a 
Commission on Coexistence and the Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination to signify 
its intention to counter the longstanding culture of discrimination in the country. This 
commission was supplemented with changes to other sectors of the Government. The changes 
included: acknowledgement of discrimination within The Budget Act and plans to avoid biases,88 																																																								
88 The Budget Act of Guatemala was an act proposing a unified approach to the control and operation of the state’s 
financial resources by integrating the budget, public lending, accounting, and the management of public sector into 
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the development of the National Institute of Statistics to better grasp the degree of discrimination 
across the country, and the creation of a new development plan, called “K’atun: Our Guatemala 
2032” to increase the standard of living for indigenous populations by addressing the gaps in 
education and health services for indigenous peoples (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of 
Issues”, 2013, p. 6). The Government created an office in 1999 under the Presidential 
Commission on Human Rights for the defense of indigenous women, who faced double 
discrimination on account of their ethnicity and gender (Salvesen, 2002, p. 14). The 
Government’s policy and subsequent structural and systematic changes indicated its desire to 
eliminate discrimination against indigenous peoples from its policies and systems. 
The Guatemalan Government applied a series of changes to the judicial sector to address 
indigenous rights.  The Guatemalan Supreme Court set up the Indigenous Affairs Unit in 2012 to 
aid in the acknowledgement of indigenous rights. The Unit created the Indigenous Interpreting 
and Translation Center in 2013, which hired 89 official interpreters to help with language 
barriers. The Public Criminal Defense Institute of Guatemala created 15 indigenous advocacy 
offices nationwide to provide legal services to rural, indigenous populations. Finally, the 
Government increased the capacity of indigenous authorities to run their own legal system 
(“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2013, p. 7). Justice is a major branch of the 
political system. Thus, by addressing some of the major areas of concern for access and 
utilization by indigenous populations, the Guatemalan Government indicated its commitment to 
indigenous rights. 
Within the education sector, the Guatemalan Government applied changes to address 
indigenous rights as dictated by the Peace Accords. The Ministry of Education implemented the 
Strategic Education Plan that focused on curriculum development to better include indigenous 																																																																																																																																																																																		
one larger institution (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2013).  
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rights, ideas, and traditions within the educational system. The Ministry classified 5,083 primary 
schools in 2013 as bilingual schools so as to better accommodate indigenous learners  (“Replies 
of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2013, p. 7). Additionally, the Indigenous Development Fund 
increased access by indigenous communities to technology and virtual connectivity and 
promoted training for the labor market with the development of training centers across the 
country (“Replies of Guatemala to the List of Issues”, 2013, p. 31). The activities by the 
Government to address education were indicative of the Government’s commitment to 
indigenous rights. 
The Government’s actions in the aftermath of the signing of the Indigenous Rights Peace 
Agreement showed the coalition government’s commitment to address the deeply rooted 
discrimination against indigenous populations. The Government’s strategy utilized policy 
changes and the development of new offices to address the issues. 
 
NGOs during the Implementation Stage for Indigenous Rights 
 
 Indigenous activism in Guatemala arose out of a broader growth of indigenous activism 
across the Americas that began in the late 1980s. The movement began with the ‘500 Years of 
Resistance Campaign’ that was “a continental protest movement against official celebration of 
the ‘discovery’ of the Americas” (Costello et al., 1997). In Guatemala, the Majawil Q’ij (‘New 
Dawn’) NGO was established in 1990 in response to the 500 Years Campaign and to reflect 
growing indigenous activism.89 The increasing indigenous activism within Guatemala led to the 
formation of the Council of Mayan Organizations of Guatemala (COMG) in 1991 who 
																																																								
89 The “group was also responsible for coordinating the second continental meeting, in Guatemala’s second city of 
Quetzaltenango, of ‘500 Years of Indigenous and Popular Resistance’. This summit, held in 1991, had a huge 
impact, strengthening Mayan consciousness and for, the first time, putting Guatemalans in touch with other 
indigenous organizations throughout North and South America” (Costello et al., 1997). 
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advocated for the “recognition of Guatemala’s ethnic and cultural diversity, basic human rights, 
and restitution for victims of the Civil War” (Garcia, Escarfuller & Andre, n.d., p. 4). This 
engagement transformed into a Pan-Mayan agenda in Guatemala, advocated by COMG but made 
up of “indigenous professionals, teachers, development workers, small business owners, and 
agriculturalists” (Warren, n.d.). The Pan-Mayan Agenda promoted indigenous rights by creating 
“hundreds of research centers, schools, and language committees throughout indigenous regions 
of the country” (Warren, n.d.).90 The Pan Mayan activism led to the adoption and ratification in 
Guatemala of ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which gave credence to 
the indigenous movement and helped put indigenous rights on the national agenda. The ILO 
Convention became relevant to indigenous activists who utilized it to assert their rights (on 
issues like mining projects on indigenous lands) in the absence of sufficient national policies 
(Garcia, Escarfuller & Andre, n.d., p. 9). “Without the Pan-Mayan movement, the recognition of 
indigenous rights might have remained little more than a political gesture in the peace process” 
(Warren, n.d.). The Pan Mayan movement’s momentum was further substantiated by the work of 
Rigoberta Menchu who brought international attention to the movement’s grievances through her 
writing, formation of various political groups, and her outspokenness.91 Menchu was exiled to 
Mexico during the Guatemalan Civil War and thus represents both the refugees and the 
indigenous populations, showing how the grievances and struggles for rights are intertwined. 
Menchu received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 for her social justice work with the indigenous 
peoples. The publicity from the prize garnered international attention focused on human rights 
																																																								
90 The Pan Mayan movement’s agenda attempted to: “unify diverse Mayan language communities, which make up 
60% of the national population; to revitalize indigenous culture, language, religion, and environmentalism; and to 
promote culturally aware education at all levels including informal adult education” (Warren, n.d.).  
 
91 The most outspoken group was the United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition (RUOG), which was a 
group of activists opposed to the War from abroad.  
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and indigenous rights issues (“Maya”, 2008). This attention only increased the expansion, 
strength, and impact of the indigenous rights movement.  
The Pan Mayan movement, aided by Rigoberta Menchu’s activism, shifted focus during the 
mid-1990s to the Guatemalan Peace Accord process. In 1994, the NGO Co-ordination of 
Organizations of the Mayan People of Guatemala (COPMAGUA) was formed. This NGO 
represented over 200 different NGOs fighting for indigenous peoples. COPMAGUA’s goals 
focused on presenting a pro-Mayan agenda during the Peace Accords process.92 This indigenous 
movement had direct impact on the Peace Accords and their content (as seen in the creation of 
the unprecedented Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Populations). 
COMPAGUA continued its fight for the implementation of the Peace Accords until 2000 when 
the NGO disbanded and other NGO’s fighting for indigenous rights could take the spotlight 
(Costello et al., 1997).93  
Despite the persistent discrimination that the indigenous population suffers from, their large 
numbers have allowed for triumphs and the formation of numerous groups. As of 2015, around 
300 Mayan organizations existed in Guatemala and are continuing the fight for indigenous rights 
(Otzoy, n.d.). These NGOs tackle a wide variety of topics related to indigenous rights. The 
Committee of Campesino Unity (CUC) and the National Coordinating Committee of Indigenous 
People and Campesinos (CONIC) deal with land rights and indigenous labor organizations. 
Other groups arose after the implementation of the Peace Accords as there was new spaces for 
																																																								
92 COPMAGUA presented a proposal for the Agreement on Indigenous rights which “outlined the historic 
discrimination and violence suffered by indigenous peoples. It mainly condemned the army, but it also blamed the 
URNG for miscalculating the disproportionate and genocidal response to its guerrilla activities” (Costello et al., 
1997).  
 
93 The reason COPMAGUA disbanded was because “almost all the activists and leaders who had been in 
COPMAGUA took up government posts. Maya politics were now being exercised from within the state itself and 
international organizations rather than [just] from indigenous organizations. Maya activists were transformed into 
public policy managers” (Bastos, 2010). 
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organizing: The Mutual Support Group (GAM) arose to cover a variety of human rights needs, 
the National Committee of Guatemalan Widows (CONAVIGUA) focused on exhumations of the 
disappeared, and the National Coordinating Committee of Displaced Peoples of Guatemala 
(CONDEG) began to demand for social and economic rights (Otzoy, n.d.). The NGOs fighting 
for indigenous rights undertook work on a myriad of issues.94 Their work directly tied to some of 
the goals from the Peace Accords; the NGOs are: 
Working to promote Mayan schools as forums in which children might gain an education 
supportive of indigenous culture and language. Additionally, they publish a wide variety of 
educational texts on indigenous issues, provide scholarships to indigenous students, and press 
for legal recognition of indigenous customary norms and the authority of elders in rural 
communities. Clearly, indigenous groups are not waiting for the official establishment of the 
accords; rather, they are already networking internationally and organizing locally to pursue 
their agenda for peace and a more inclusive national society. (“The Indigenous Role in 
Guatemalan Peace”, n.d.) 
 
NGOs have been and continue to be active in the implementation of the Peace Accords and the 
plight for indigenous rights. And their work has had distinct impact: “the growing numbers of 
indigenous middle-level professionals, such as teachers, nurses, NGO promoters and technical 
personnel in various fields, and an ever-growing number of university students will begin to have 
an increasing effect on achievement of indigenous rights” (Minority Rights Group International, 
2008).  
 The indigenous rights movement momentum that began in the 1980s continues today. 
Indigenous activists are actively fighting for rights that they deserve and have not yet achieved or 
gained through Accords and Government actions. These NGOs have the same goals of the 
Government in terms of indigenous rights, in part, because the indigenous activists formulated 																																																								
94 Some groups emphasize the cultural oppression that Mayas have suffered since the Spanish Conquest. They see 
cultural and racial discrimination at the root of the economic exploitation of the Mayas. Other Mayan organizations 
focus on more projects such as technical training and literacy workshops. One subset of this tendency is working 
with the Government's social-compensation funds. Mayas are also active in popular organizations that fight for 
human rights and socioeconomic demands, including health, education, housing, and land (Otzoy, n.d.). 
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the Agreement the state is adhering to. However, the NGOs and the Guatemala Government have 
pursued different strategies in attaining the goals. NGOs have developed their own movement 
and increased their conception of rights; this increase in rights mobilization has permeated 
indigenous populations and led to the development of hundreds of NGOs fighting for social 
justice on a ground level.  
 
Relationship of Complementarity: 
 
The Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan NGOs entered into a relationship of 
complementarity in Guatemala’s post conflict phase when addressing refugees and indigenous 
rights.  
During the refugee resettlement, the Guatemalan Government created and tried to 
implement its own repatriation plan; this plan was then countered with a resettlement strategy 
designed by the uprooted populations. The refugees’ plan was eventually accepted and promoted 
by the Government. The Government’s top down approach did repatriate 6,000 refugees (Long, 
2007, p. 4). The more bottom-up approach allowed for greater autonomy and ownership of the 
process by the uprooted populations. The goal for these two entities was the same: resettle those 
who had been uprooted during the war. Their two different strategies both supported this goal. 
In terms of indigenous rights, the Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan NGOs 
pursued different strategies in the effort to implement indigenous rights across the state’s 
institutions and across the nation. The Government’s actions reflect a top down approach: they 
changed polices, created laws, and established new offices in hopes of implementing the 
Agreement on Indigenous Rights. The NGO’s took a bottom up approach. A myriad of NGOs 
arose, so many so that a pro-Mayan movement developed with tremendous momentum. This 
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movement addressed ground level issues. Indigenous rights NGOs operated outside of policy 
work. Their work was often concerned with developing activists, trying to educate the 
indigenous communities and the general public on indigenous issues and rights, developing 
projects to improve standards of life, and vocalizing their struggles.  
The relationship of complementarity during refugee repatriation and indigenous rights 
dissemination is grounded in the relative power of the NGOs in relation to the Government in 
enacting changes and addressing grievances from ground level approaches. The Government 
utilized a top down approach because of their power to create and change laws, institutions, and 
programs.  
 
Current State of the Peace Accord Implementation for Indigenous Rights 
 
 The work by both the Guatemalan Government and the NGOs has resulted in some 
positive developments for indigenous rights. To begin with, the fact that the Guatemala Peace 
Accords included an Agreement on Indigenous Rights is a significant step because it shows the 
Government’s commitment to addressing one of the root causes of the war: the social inequality 
and discrimination faced by the majority of the Guatemalan population. This Peace Agreement 
has led to transformations of the Guatemalan state. Since the signing of the Agreement, Mayan 
leaders have begun to occupy important government positions,95 which helps advance those 
particular indigenous citizens but also helps the general indigenous movement, because those in 
leadership positions will be aware and sensitive to particular issues. Furthermore, the Peace 
Agreement has opened up new spaces for indigenous rights and themes to be discussed and acted 
upon. These new opportunities include: “the Academy of Mayan Languages, the Fund of 
																																																								
95 These positions include: Culture Minister, General Director of Bilingual Education, and Secretary of Peace 
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Indigenous Development, the Defense Council for Indigenous Women, the Presidential 
Commission Against Discrimination and Racism, and the multitude of small offices within 
ministries that make up the Indigenous State Coordinator” (Bastos, 2010). The UN Committee 
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination generates reports annually on the state of 
implementation of indigenous rights and the elimination of racial/ ethnic discrimination. This 
Committee commends the work by the Guatemalan Government in enacting laws for Mayan 
Languages, for respecting indigenous dress in schools, and for encouraging bilingual education 
(“Compilación de Observaciones Finales”, 2006, p. 281). In 2008, an NGO driven action was 
successful with the inauguration of a TV station dedicated to the diffusion of Mayan Culture and 
language (Minority Rights Group International, 2008)96. This TV channel was a major success 
for the NGOs who sought to educate the citizens of Guatemala about the indigenous 
communities. NGOs have accomplished many ground level initiatives for indigenous rights with 
dissemination of information about their culture, development projects, and increased visibility 
across the nation. The work by both NGOs and the Guatemalan Government on implementing 
the Agreement on Indigenous Rights has achieved some of the goals, yet there are a number of 
persist problems within the post-conflict society.  
The areas of concern regarding indigenous rights range across all sectors of society. In their 
annual report, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed its 
concern with: the dearth of statistical data on indigenous people, the deeply embedded racism 
and racial discrimination persisting in society, the continuing inequality in society,97 the lack of 
																																																								
96 This was particularly important because the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination had 
recognized “the attitudes of disdain and rejection towards indigenous people in the media” (“Compilación de 
Observaciones Finales”, 2006, p. 285) so the work by the NGOs was vital to counter this. 
97 “In numbers recognized and accepted in governmental spheres
 
shows that […] Poverty in Indigenous Peoples is 
74%” (“A Critical View”, 2010, p. 9). Poverty is a good indicator of social inequality. 
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access to justice by indigenous populations,98 the low political participation by indigenous 
peoples, the lack of access to land by indigenous people, the lack of respect for traditional 
indigenous territories,99 the granting of mining licenses by the state on indigenous lands,100 and 
the high illiteracy rates of indigenous populations (“Compilación de Observaciones Finales”, 
2006, p. 284). 101 There are also health concerns for indigenous populations: “indigenous 
Guatemalan women are three times more likely to die during pregnancy and childbirth than non-
indigenous women” (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2009). Even though the 
Guatemalan Peace Accords designated for improved access to voting for indigenous populations, 
there are still access issues including: “tedious voter registration requirements, elections 
scheduled during harvest season, and inadequate transportation” (Minority Rights Group 
International, 2008). These persistent voter access issues limit increased political participation 
for the indigenous populations thereby limiting the dissemination of their rights and the 
addressing of their grievances. Indigenous Guatemalans continue to have a number of other key 
grievances, including:  
[Issues of] protection, redistribution and access to land […] Other enduring issues include 
lack of constitutional support for indigenous civil rights and status; the location and 
identification of indigenous persons disappeared or dead since the internal armed conflict; the 																																																								
98 In particular, the committee is concerned about the “lack of recognition and enforcement of the indigenous legal 
system and the lack of adequate interpreters and competent bilingual ex-officio defenders in court proceedings” 
(“Compilación de Observaciones Finales”, 2006, p. 285). 
 
99 “Many indigenous groups consider the Government's use of sacred grounds (so called Mayan ruins) as profitable 
tourist destinations as an affront to their spiritual rights. There is no free access to these sacred sites for indigenous 
Guatemalans and no government policy guaranteeing the long-term preservation or protection of ceremonial sites as 
archaeological preserves” (Minority Rights Group International, 2008). 
 
100 As of 2010, there were “459 concessions [licenses] (259 to exploit, 136 to mineral exploration and 64 
hydroelectric projects among others). All of them located on indigenous territories. These megaprojects are 
generating disastrous cultural, social and environmental effects for our Life and Mother Earth” (“A Critical View”, 
2010, p. 9). 
101 As of 2010: “from every 10 illiterate persons, 6 are indigenous; 53% of indigenous people between the ages of 15 
and 64 know how to read and write; 23% of indigenous children have no degree of schooling” (“A Critical View”, 
2010, p. 17). 
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prosecution of war crimes and human rights abuses committed during the civil war;102 the 
right to teach, publish and deal with the government in indigenous languages; less 
discriminatory police services; greater political rights in their own communities; access to 
justice, including the right to administer indigenous justice. (Minority Rights Group 
International, 2008) 
 
Work by both the Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan NGOs is needed to challenge the 
myriad of lasting issues.  
 There are a few obstacles that are preventing the fulfillment of the promises by 
Guatemalan Government and NGOs on indigenous rights. These barriers include a lack of 
resources, a lack of political will, and deeply embedded biases. During the implementation 
phase, the Guatemalan Government created a series of offices and policies to address the 
inequalities and the lack of access to education and health for indigenous populations. While in 
theory those were good steps for indigenous rights, inadequate resources have undermined their 
potential. “Guatemala has among the lowest levels of health and education spending relative to 
GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean, despite steps taken since the 1996 Peace Accords to 
increase social spending” (Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2009, p. 6). Many of the 
efforts to promote indigenous culture and social rights were hindered because of a lack of 
political will (Minority Rights Group International, 2008). Although there is a commitment on 
paper for the Government to disseminate and protect indigenous rights, they largely have not 
followed through. Rigoberta Menchu’s declaration that “this world's not going to change unless 
we're willing to change ourselves” (“Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation”, n.d.) is indicative of 
her understanding about the limited political resolve within the Government. Change needed to 
come from sources outside of government structures.103 The Guatemalan Government has 
																																																								
102 This issue will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four on Justice issues. 
 
103 It is important to note however that political will may not be the sole reason that indigenous rights, and other 
issues from the Accords, have not been implemented. There is an argument that would assert that even with political 
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traditionally been comprised of non-indigenous people, thus those with the power to act had no 
connection and/or knowledge to indigenous problems and rights.104 This lack of diversity could 
limit their will to act politically for indigenous rights. The limited political motivation could have 
also stemmed from the deeply rooted biases that still exist in post-conflict society about 
indigenous peoples; those in power may have been biased against some of the programs to 
enhance indigenous rights. This bias was evident in the words of UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan who warned that Guatemala was still facing entrenched problems of “’the previously 
taboo topics of racism and discrimination’ against the country's indigenous population” even in 
2004 as MINUGUA’s mandate ended (“UN Mission”, 2004).105 This continuing discrimination, 
racism, and stereotyping is preventing the attainment of rights by indigenous populations in 
Guatemala because society does not view this population as equals and does not respect their 
history, traditions, and culture.  
 
Why Complementarity?  
 
  The Guatemalan Government entered into a relationship of complementarity with the 
NGOs because both the uprooted populations and the indigenous populations constituted a large 																																																																																																																																																																																		
will, little would have been done due to weak structures and strong corruption within the Government. This 
argument could be valid. However, for the purpose of the argument on relationships in this project, the emphasis is 
placed on political will.  Political will speaks to the nature of the coalition government and illuminates the reasons 
the refugees and indigenous rights activists have become so active in their own rights and futures (since the 
Government was not directly motivated to do so).  
 
104 Since the end of the Civil War, the coalition governments have been dominated by non indigenous politicians— 
these politicians want to appease NGOs but they do not have a greater interest in transforming and addressing 
discrimination at a deeper level. Indigenous peoples have been unable to fill positions of power due to obstacles to 
voting and limited emphasis placed on indigenous political participation. There have been attempts, and a few 
successes, for indigenous activists to fill government positions as noted in this chapter. However, overall there lacks 
sustained political empowerment of indigenous leaders.  
 
105 MINUGUA was supposed to bring with it changes and improvements in Guatemala. As MINUGUA ended, post-
conflict Guatemala should have reflected the progress of the implementation of the Accords. Kofi Annan’s words 
are indicative of the deeply entrenched discrimination that is persistent and to which MINUGUA was unable to fully 
address prior to leaving the country.  
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sector of people and voices. These communities, if not addressed, could have become a potential 
threat to the status quo of those in powerful political positions. Thus, in order to squelch potential 
threats, the Guatemalan Government acted in its best interest and worked with the groups.  
In terms of the uprooted populations, the refugees acted in an unprecedented way by 
engaging in the dialogues about their repatriation. The Guatemalan Government understood that 
there was international pressure to address their grievances and therefore accepted this direct 
demand for engagement. For the Guatemalan Government to retain power, in the face of 
international pressure (like the UNHCR and Rigoberta Menchu’s pleas), it had to accept what 
this large sector of society was asking for. The domestic pressures were stronger than those of 
the international community, therefore the Government responded with a relationship of 
complementarity. The Government accepted a strategy that may not have been their preferred 
plan but would ensure that they would retain power. The new Government had its first direct 
confrontation by the uprooted populations early on. The majority of the refugees rejected the 
Government’s repatriation plan; this rejection was a challenge to the power and authority of the 
state. As a way to regain their status, the Guatemalan Government acquiesced to the refugees’ 
demands. The refugees’ unprecedented actions countered the Guatemalan Government in the 
early 1990s but also presented a developing power by this large population group. Their time in 
exile and their work with the UNHCR and the Guatemalan Government gave the refugees 
negotiation techniques and tools that could be utilized again upon returning to the country. This 
perceived skills development by the refugees provided an incentive to the Government to comply 
with their demands so as to prevent further political challenges by this group. The Guatemalan 
Government formed the relationship of complementarity in reaction to direct and perceived 
threats to their political power.  
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The Guatemala Government’s actions in regards to the indigenous rights movement 
reflect this same political survival. In the aftermath of the conflict, indigenous activists began to 
grasp a new conception of their rights and used this new notion to develop a powerful pro-Mayan 
movement. This movement included more than 300 NGOs fighting for indigenous rights. The 
indigenous population in Guatemala makes up the majority: “60 percent of Guatemala's 
population is made up of indigenous peoples - more than 60 million inhabitants” (“Indigenous 
Peoples in Guatemala”, 2015). The indigenous peoples had power in numbers. Thus, it was in 
the Government’s best interest to appease the indigenous activists. If their grievances were not 
addressed, or their rights not attainted, or at least sought after, the indigenous populations could 
have posed a real threat to the Government’s power and political survival.  Indigenous activists 
have shown their power in numbers, they frequently hold make protests and marches throughout 
the country. The Guatemalan Government in the 1990s predicted the power of the indigenous 
activists correctly. The Government’s fears came to reality in 2015 when President Molina was 
ousted from his position as a result of protests from thousands of demonstrators, including 72 
rural and indigenous organizations (Kearns, 2015). The political potential shown in 2015 by 
indigenous activists has been increasing for the last 22 years. Therefore, for the Government 
there has been a significant threat to their political survival from the indigenous populations 
during the post-conflict phase. The Guatemalan Government supported indigenous activism by 
providing the political mechanisms and machinery that aided their ground level work. By 
creating the Agreement on Indigenous Rights, new laws, positions, and programs from a top 
down approach, the Government was constructing spaces for indigenous activists to act from a 
ground level approach. The changes in laws and policies bettered the indigenous population, but 
they were intended to preserve the political status quo of the Government.  
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The relationship of complementarity formed by the Guatemalan Government and the 
NGOs reflects the nature of the oppressed and complaints (there were many of them and they 
were vocal) in relationship to the Government’s plight for political survival. This relationship 
arose out of the mutual goals shared by the entities but the varied strategies taken by the two 
groups. 
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Chapter 4: Relationship of Competition on Justice Issues 
 
 The Guatemalan Civil War left numerous human rights violations in its wake. The 
Government sponsored Guatemalan Truth Commission registered 42,275 victims of the Civil 
War (Tomuschat, Lux de Coti, & Tojo, 1999, p. 17).106 The conflict also constituted acts of 
genocide (REMHI, 1999, p. 292).107 Genocide is incredibly destructive and generates strong, 
persistent calls for justice for the heinous crime. The calls for justice for the multitude of human 
rights violations are reverberating across the Guatemalan state; these demands began during the 
Peace Accords process and have continued to this day. Justice has been the weakest of the three 
areas studied in post-conflict Guatemala. Very few of those responsible for crimes during the 
Civil War have been indicted and prosecuted. Furthermore, the State sponsored truth commission 
(CEH) illuminated major problems within the justice system in Guatemala during the armed 
conflict. These included the: “systematic denial of habeas corpus, continuous interpretation of 
the law favorable to the authorities, [and] indifference to the torture of detainees” (Mersky, 2005, 
p. 17).  Overall, the judiciary submitted to the demands of the repressive state through tolerance 
and direct participation thereby losing credibility as a guarantor of justice. “This allowed 
impunity to become one of the most important mechanisms for generating and maintaining a 
																																																								
106 These numbers come directly from the Government’s records. Within these number “23,671 were victims of 
arbitrary execution and 6,159 were victims of forced disappearance” (Tomuschat, Lux de Coti, & Tojo, 1999, p. 17). 
This number most likely is lower than the real numbers since it is Government sponsored. The Government is 
responsible for committing a majority of the crimes and therefore would be less willing to share the extent of their 
responsibility.  
107 The international, legally accepted definition of genocide comes from the Genocide Convention of 1948 and 
defines the crime as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Van der Vyver, 1999, p. 289). 
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climate of terror” (Mersky, 2005, p. 17). The issues within the judiciary prevented justice from 
being obtained during the conflict and therefore left numerous grievances unaddressed.  
 The Peace Accords sought to tackle some of the justice issues and limit the culture of 
impunity arising in the aftermath of the conflict through the Agreement on the Strengthening of 
Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. This Agreement had 
limited impact on reigning in the impunity in the post-conflict society.    
The Guatemalan Government was responsible for 93% of the violations during the Civil 
War (Tomuschat, Lux de Coti, & Tojo, 1999, p. 20). Many of those responsible for committing 
crimes retain power to this day. In the aftermath of the conflict, members of the previous regime 
gained important posts and remained influential. Past perpetrators who occupy positions in the 
coalition governments have little motivation to pursue justice reforms and stop the culture of 
impunity. The coalition Government has had to mediate between calls for justice from the 
progressives and calls of protection from past violators within its own institution. NGOs have 
been tirelessly working on justice issues since the end of the Civil War; their success began in 
the early 2000s and they have continually made substantial progress and spearheaded landmark 
cases on the justice front. The Guatemalan Government and the NGOs have formed a 
competitive relationship on justice issues because of their competing goals and the Government’s 
desire to retain power despite their past wrong doings.  
 
Content of the Peace Agreement  
 
 The Guatemalan Government, the URNG and the UN signed the Agreement on the 
Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society on 
September 19, 1996 in Mexico City. The Peace Agreement was a broad package of provisions 
aimed at strengthening the democratic government; it called for reforms in the legislative, 
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executive, and judicial branches. For this chapter, the most relevant aspects of this Agreement 
lay in the reforms for the justice sector. The Agreement declared that reforms of the justice 
sector were necessary to prevent the judiciary from causing and covering up a system of 
impunity. The reforms were developed to: “put an end to inefficiency, eradicate corruption and 
guarantee free access to the justice system,108 [and to guarantee] impartiality in the application of 
the law, judicial independence, ethical authority and the integrity and modernization of the 
system as a whole” (“Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power”, 1996). The 
Agreement also called for reforms to the penal code which prioritized prosecution of offenses 
that “are most detrimental to society, takes into account the country's cultural differences and 
customs, fully protects human rights, and characterizes threats and coercion of judicial 
personnel, bribery, graft and corruption as particularly serious offences which are severely 
punished” (“Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power”, 1996). Another key provision 
of the Agreement was an effective protection plan for witnesses and prosecutors. The Agreement 
on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic 
Society established reforms for the Government to implement to improve the justice system and 
end the culture of impunity. 
 
Actions by the Guatemalan Government to Implement the Peace Agreement 
 
 The Guatemala Government took a series of steps to implement the Peace Agreement on 
Civilian Power.109 Right after signing the Agreement, the Guatemalan Congress approved a new 																																																								
108 Access is described further on in the Agreement: “free access to the system of justice in the person's own 
language; respect for the multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual nature of Guatemala; legal assistance to those 
who cannot afford their own counsel” (“Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power”, 1996). 
 
109 This chapter focuses on the justice sector reforms that are relevant to the Government-NGO relationship. The 
Government has implemented other policies and laws to address public security functions and a restructuring of the 
military and intelligence functions. More information of this can be found in “Guatemala: Five Years After the 
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Criminal Procedure code in 1994 that included guarantees of due process and human rights 
(Mersky, 2005, p. 17). The Government made some notable advances on justice system reforms 
and on implementing the Peace Accords, the improvements included: 
[The] creation of the legal and administrative framework for the reform of the sector 
(Judiciary, Public Prosecutor, Public Defender Institute, and penitentiary system); 
modernization plans defined for the Supreme Court, Public Ministry and prison system; 
advances in justice sector coordination, both centrally and locally; greatly increased 
territorial coverage of the judiciary at the municipal level; creation of a free public defenders 
service; increased space for civil society proposals and monitoring of the justice system, both 
centrally and locally; increased numbers of court interpreters and judiciary officials who 
speak indigenous languages; reform of procedures for selecting judges and magistrates; and 
passage of the Judicial Career Law and Judicial Systems Civil Service law. (Mersky, 2005, p. 
18) 
 
The Guatemalan Government, at least on the surface level, tried to reform many aspects of the 
justice system. Another major Governmental action was the ratification of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2012 (“Concluding Observations”, 2012, p. 1) which 
established international jurisdiction over major crimes against humanity—including genocide. 
The Guatemalan Government established a new security protocol for protecting justice officials 
(“Replies from the Government of Guatemala”, 2011, p. 23). The National Reparations Program 
created in 2005 provided compensation for victims of “enforced disappearance, extrajudicial 
execution, physical and psychological torture, forced displacement, forced recruitment of minors, 
sexual violence, child rape, and massacres” (“Replies from the Government of Guatemala”, 
2011, p. 6).110 The Reparations program aimed to provide five forms of reparation including 
material compensation, monetary compensation, psychological reparation, psychosocial 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Peace Accords” Page 10 in the table for The Agreement on Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of The 
Armed Forces 
 
110 The work for reparations is tied to the commitments in the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights. 
Reparations are grounded in the human rights violations that were caused and therefore this program is discussed 
here. Furthermore, receiving the reparations acted as a form of justice for many.  
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rehabilitation, and restoration of dignity. Though the Government established this program, it did 
not guarantee that all victims received proper compensation and thus the grievance persists. The 
Government signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with the UN to establish the Guatemala 
and the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to help investigate 
human rights violations and organized crime (“Concluding Observations”, 2012, p. 2).111 CICIG 
did beneficial justice work on the ground through investigations, but it also created international 
pressure, through the UN, on the Guatemalan Government regarding justice issues.  
 Despite their judicial reform policy efforts, the Government created a law that impeded 
justice. In 1996, one day after the final Peace Accord was signed, Congress passed the National 
Reconciliation Law. This law provided an permanent extinction of criminal responsibility for 
crimes committed during the armed conflict. However, “the amnesty would not apply to 
‘genocide, torture, forced disappearance, or other crimes that are imprescriptible or which do not 
permit amnesty under domestic law or international treaties ratified by Guatemala’” (Mersky, 
2005, p. 28). This stipulation is important because it left open the possibility of cases for major 
human rights violations which did occur during the conflict and for which the 1990s and early 
2000s did not produce any major convictions. The National Reconciliation Law was a early 
indicator of the Government’s stance of justice and impunity because it was a mechanism created 
to essentially protect those in governmental positions.  
																																																								
111 “The Commission was endowed with the ability to bring criminal charges as a complementary prosecutor in 
Guatemalan courts. In addition, it has the power to propose public policies, including judicial and institutional 
reforms aimed at eradicating the [dismantle illegal groups and clandestine security structures]. It also has the power 
to request disciplinary procedures against any public official that fails to cooperate or obstructs the CICIG’s work. 
In sum, it is an international organization established to investigate and support the prosecution and dismantling of 
criminal networks under Guatemalan legislation and within Guatemala’s justice system, whose goal is to build 
capacity in local state institutions” (The Washington Office on Latin America, 2015, p. 4). 
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Timeline of Court Cases Related to the Conflict 
 
 To best understand the work by the Government and NGOs on justice issues in post-
conflict Guatemala, this section will create a timeline of major cases.  
 It is important to note that under Guatemalan Constitutional law, those who hold 
governmental positions cannot be tried under the court of law, The provision that creates this 
immunity is known as The Ley of Antejuicio.112 This immunity is terminated when the political 
official no longer holds office. The Ley of Antejuicio covers the Guatemalan President, the vice 
President, congressmen, mayors, deputies, secretaries, judges, attorney general, Human Rights 
Ombudsman, and more. As Guatemala transitioned into democracy, many of human rights 
violators who had previously held positions of power retained those positions and therefore 
gained immunity. This was an immunity that was outside the amnesty applied under the National 
Reconciliation Law. An example of this immunity in practice is with General Rios Montt, a 
major perpetrator of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, who was protected for 
15 years because he was a member of Congress. However, after a failed reelection in 2012, his 
immunity expired and the criminal proceedings began against him (White, n.d.).113 Many of the 
justice cases that have occurred, and will be explored in the next section, are against those who 
were formally part of the Government but no longer are and therefore no longer immune. The 
perpetrators still in governmental positions could not and, to this day, cannot, be tried.  
 The timeline is divided by significant years in the post-conflict phase and will include the 																																																								
112 The Ley of Antejuicio reads: “dignitaries and public officials [are] not be arrested or subject to criminal 
proceedings before the relevant courts […] The preliminary hearing is a right inherent to the position, inalienable, 
imprescriptible and inalienable. The right of impeachment ends when the officer or public officer ceases to hold 
office, and may not invoke in his favor, even when they are called for actions occurring during the performance of 
their duties” (Palacios, 2015). 
 
113 The Timeline of Events section in this chapter will discuss the criminal proceedings against Montt 
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major justice cases. This timeline will illustrate the progress in the 21st century on the justice 
front in Guatemala. The timeline intends to demonstrate the competitive relationship present 
between the coalition government and the NGOs on justice issues since the signing of the 
Accords. This timeline will expose the active struggles by NGOs to pursue justice as they are 
met with begrudging help and/or direct opposition through obstacles to justice by some members 
in the Government.   
Table 5: Timeline of Justice Events 
Year Information 
1999 Genocide Case brought to the Spanish National Court 
2000 ‘Friendly Settlements’ with the Inter-American Human Rights System 
2001 Complaint filed against General Rios Montt 
2003 Complaints filed for forced disappearances  
2007 Request for the declassification of military documents was filed 
2009 4 former military members found guilty for forced disappearances 
2010 3 former military members found guilty for forced disappearances 
2011 4 former military officers found guilty for Dos Erres Massacre 
2011 General Hector Mario López Fuentes arrested for crimes of genocide 
2011 Rios Montt indicted for masterminding Dos Erres Massacre 
2012 Rios Montt found guilty in Dos Erres Massacre 
2012 Ixhil Genocide Case proceeding 
2012 Pedro Pimental found guilty for role in Dos Erres Massacre 
2012 Pedro Garcia Arredondo found guilty for forced disappearance  
2013 Two former military members convicted for forced disappearances 
2013 Rios Montt found guilty of Genocide 
2013 Constitutional Court overturns Montt Conviction 
2015 Retrial for Montt 
 
 In 1999, The Rigoberta Menchu Tum Foundation filed a complaint in the Spanish 
National Court charging General Efraín Ríos Montt and other Guatemalan officials for terrorism, 
genocide and torture.114 Guatemalan NGOs filed this case using the principle of universal 
																																																								
114 The complaint was based on three major events during the Civil War: “the attack on the Spanish Embassy in 
Guatemala by the Guatemalan security forces in January 1980 in which 37 people died, including Spanish Embassy 
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jurisdiction because they were not satisfied by their national justice system to fairly prosecute 
cases from the Civil War.115 “Because of the refusal of Guatemalan courts to prosecute those 
responsible for the genocide, the Guatemalan Genocide Case in Spain became a critical avenue 
of justice for these survivors” (“Justice in Guatemala”, n.d.). From 2000 to 2005, the Spanish 
National Court engaged in legal battles over the claim, regarding jurisdiction, and the rights of 
non-Spanish citizens to bring claims in Spain. In 2006, Judge Pedraz of Spain issued arrest 
warrants for the eight defendants. However, in 2007 the Guatemalan Constitutional Court 
declared the arrests warrants and the calls for extradition invalid. In 2008, Judge Pedraz invited 
witnesses of the Guatemalan genocide to come witness and testify in Spain; 40 indigenous 
Guatemalans went to Madrid, marking the first recorded documentation of the genocide from the 
Civil War (“The Guatemalan Genocide Case”, n.d.).116 Unfortunately, to this day, the case is still 
pending and delayed based on claims of invalidity from the Guatemalan judiciary.117 Throughout 
the entire Spanish genocide case proceedings, the coalition Government has shown their 
resistance to justice.  
 In 2000, NGOs made significant progress on the justice front. After years of efforts by a 																																																																																																																																																																																		
staff and Rigoberta Menchú’s father; [the] persecution suffered by the Menchú family, exemplifying targeting of 
indigenous peoples by the Guatemalan security services; the “disappearance” or extrajudicial execution of several 
Spanish clergy during Guatemala’s conflict years” (“Guatemala’s Lethal Legacy”, 2002, p. 65). 
 
115 Universal Jurisdiction is the principle that “all states have the obligation to cooperate in the identification, 
detention, extradition or trial of persons responsible for certain crimes, regardless of the victims’ nationality, the 
place committed, or the nationality or position of perpetrators” (“Guatemala’s Lethal Legacy”, 2002, p. 64). This 
was a precedent that had been applied in the genocide case against Dictator Pinochet from Chile.  
 
116 The Truth Commissions noted that ‘acts that constituted genocide’ had taken place, but no testimony was 
provided in the commissions regarding the genocide. The testimony in Madrid was the first recorded testimony by 
witnesses that highlighted the acts of genocide, the victims, and the consequences.  
 
117 One success from the Spanish National Court was that “In April 2011, Pedraz issued an arrest warrant and an 
extradition request for Jorge Sosa Orantes for his participation in the Dos Erres massacre of 1982, where more than 
200 people, including women, children, and the elderly, were brutally slaughtered. Orantes was arrested by 
Canadian authorities after taking up residence in Lethbridge, Alberta” (“The Guatemalan Genocide Case”, n.d.). 
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variety of NGOs to bring the human rights violation cases to the Inter-American Human Rights 
System, the work of the NGOs led to a victory “when the Guatemalan Government agreed to 
‘friendly settlements’ on a number of cases under the aegis of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights. Under this procedure, the Government acknowledged generalized 
responsibility of state agents for a number of specific past abuses and agreed to pay unspecified 
compensation” (“Guatemala’s Lethal Legacy”, 2002, p. 63). This admission of responsibility 
was a significant step for NGOs who had become frustrated by the futile justice system in 
Guatemala and were looking for some sort of resolution to their continuing grievances; the 
‘friendly suits’ guaranteed reparations to some victims.  
 A significant human rights violation during the Civil War was the tactic of forced 
disappearances which produced thousands of victims and left a post-conflict society yearning for 
answers about the disappeared. In 2003, a case for forced disappearances was brought to court. 
The NGO Association of Relatives of Detained and Disappeared of Guatemala, (FAMDEGUA) 
joined Centro Para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) in filing a court case on 
behalf of a relative of a disappeared person. The case proceeded slowly, but in 2009, former 
member of the Guatemalan military, Felipe Cusanero Coj, was sentenced to 150 years in prison 
for the forced disappearances of six people (“CALDH”, n.d.). Enforced disappearance was not 
covered by the National Reconciliation Law and therefore no amnesty existed. This landmark 
case opened up the possibility for other cases to be brought to the Guatemalan court in regard to 
disappearances during the conflict, thereby leading to increased threats for the security of the 
coalition Government in light of this new category of cases. In fact, from 2009 to 2013, ten 
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major convictions for the crimes of enforced disappearances occurred.118  
2007 was a major year for human rights activists who had been pushing for the 
Government to release documents from the war which demonstrated the Government’s guilt and 
gave information that would be beneficial to court proceedings. A variety of NGOs in 2007 
requested that the Government declassify four military documents: “the Operation Victory 82 
plan, the Firmness 83 plan, Operation Ixil, and Operation Sophia” (Martinez, 2013). These 
documents would help lead to convictions in a series of cases because they would point to 
information about the victims and the guilty. The process was slow, but in 2009 the Public 
Ministry of Guatemala and a variety of NGOs received the declassified documents.  
2011 and 2012 were significant years for the pursuit of justice. Justice finally was served 
for the Dos Erres Massacre, a massacre in 1982 where soldiers murdered over 250 people, 
including children (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 4). Four retired officers were sentenced to life 
in prison for their participation in the Dos Erres Massacre, A Guatemalan judge indicted Montt 
for allegedly masterminding the Dos Erres massacre and the judge ruled there was sufficient 
evidence to try him. “The prosecution contend[ed] that while Rios did not directly organize the 
massacre itself, he orchestrated the state policies that gave rise to it. Furthermore as supreme 
commander of the armed forces he bore ultimate responsibility” (White, n.d.). And in 2012, a 
																																																								
118 Four former members of the Guatemalan military were tried and convicted for crimes of forced disappearances in 
2009: Colonel Marco Antonio Sánchez Samayoa and former military commissioners José Domingo Ríos Martínez, 
Gabriel Álvarez Ramos, and Salomón Maldonado Ríos were each sentenced to 53 years of imprisonment. In 2010, 
three other former military officers were tried and convicted for the crime of forced disappearances: former military 
officer Felipe Cusanero was sentenced to 150 years of imprisonment for the enforced disappearances of six people 
between 1982 and 1984 and former agents of the now defunct national police force, Héctor Ramírez Ríos and 
Abraham Lancerio Gómez, were sentenced each to 40 years for forced disappearances (“Replies from the 
Government of Guatemala”, 2011, p. 5). In 2012, Former Police Commander Pedro Garcia Arredondo was 
sentenced to prison for 70 years for a forced disappearance case. In 2013, Hector Bol de la Cruz and Jorge 
Humberto Gomez Lopez were convicted and sentenced each to 40 years in prison for their role in the disappearance 
of a person in 1984 (“Guatemala 2013 Human Rights Report”, 2013, p. 3). 
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former member of the Army’s Special Forces, Pedro Pimental was sentenced to 6,060 years in 
prison for his role in the Dos Erres Massacre (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 3). The first actions 
for a national genocide case took place this year. General Hector Mario López Fuentes was 
arrested in 2011 for the crimes of genocide and other crimes against humanity committed in the 
Ixil region during the conflict. The case was put on hold because of Fuentes’ health, and he has 
since passed away (White, n.d.). 2011 was a major year in Guatemala because the state was 
beginning to show its inclination to prosecute the crimes from the Civil War. The budding 
willingness can partially be attributed to President Otto Perez Molina yearning to see the US ban 
on military aid lifted. This conditional agreement was based on whether or not Guatemala would 
begin “prosecuting war criminals and improving its justice system” (White, n.d.). This 
motivation for greater anti-impunity actions created a relatively successful 2011 and led the way 
for victories in 2012. The justice momentum in these two years demonstrated how the work of 
activists was paying off and how some members of the coalition Government were slowly 
beginning to acquiesce and fight for justice.  
 In 2013, the struggle for a conviction of genocide came to a head. This case began in 
2001 when the Association for Justice and Reconciliation (AJR) filed a complaint to the 
Guatemalan public prosecutor against former head of State, Efrian Rios Montt, for genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in the Ixhil region. The complaint accused Rios Montt of 
using and directing his troops to use the ‘Scorched Earth’ policy that destroyed communities in 
their entirety during the conflict (“CALDH”, n.d.).119 Criminal proceedings began in 2012 
(Paniagua, Amezquita & Martinez, 2012, p. 24).120 This case was significant because the victims 																																																								
119 Refer back to Chapter One for information on the Scorched Earth tactic. 
 
120 This genocide case followed on the heels of the case Dos Erres Massacre Case also involving Rios Montt which 
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(and victims’ relatives) from the region participated as plaintiffs to advance the genocide 
charges. In 2013, Guatemalan Judge Miguel Angel Galvez sent Rios Montt’s case to court for 
the crime of genocide in the Ixhil region; this trial was significant because it was the “first time 
in Latin American history that a former Head of State will be tried for genocide in a national 
court” (White, n.d.). On May 10, 2013 Rios Montt was convicted of genocide and was sentenced 
to 80 years in jail. However, on May 20, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court overturned the 
conviction claiming a mistrial based on a technicality. The retrial was delayed and began in 
January 2015. A caveat of the retrial is that Rios Montt can be found guilty or not guilty, but will 
not receive a sentence because of his age and failing health (White, n.d.). The struggle for justice 
against Montt still continues. The Government has used a serious of appeals to try to protect 
Montt. These appeals include: “that he was not responsible for all the actions of his troops on the 
ground, that the state policies to exterminate the Ixhil were in place before he came to power, 
and that he is immune from prosecution, due to an amnesty law passed in 1996 [The 1996 Law 
of National Reconciliation]” (White, n.d.). Montt’s case and appeals are examples of how hard 
some members of Guatemalan Government are working to protect one of its own to hinder 
further justice efforts as members exit their protected positions. 
 The above cases are examples of major, landmark events in the pursuit for justice. The 
Guatemalan Public Prosecutors office has “received 3,385 case files of human rights violations 
and crimes against humanity committed against 5,908 victims of the internal armed conflict” 
(“Replies from the Government of Guatemala”, 2011, p. 7) since the Peace Accords were signed 
in 1996. Though the landmark cases make the news, the work on justice is progressing on 
numerous cases related to human rights violations from the Civil War. NGOs are active in work 																																																																																																																																																																																		
concluded in early 2012; Montt was found guilty, but his lawyers are still appealing to the present day by using the 
amnesty defense (Human Rights Watch, 2013).  
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for justice: they are bringing the cases to the courts and thereby forcing the hands of the 
Government to act against impunity. 
 This timeline intends to create a historical narrative relating to justice in post-conflict 
Guatemala. This narrative illuminates the slow justice work within the country. The timeline 
illustrates how NGOs have been at the heart of the work, often against a begrudging Government 
who is accused in the landmark cases. An understanding of the justice history will help clarify 
the competitive relationship type adopted on justice issues during the Peace Accord 
implementation phase.  
 
Actions by NGOs on Justice Issues  
 
 The timeline shows how crucial NGOs were in bringing justice cases to the courts. This 
section will briefly explore the work of three NGOs who played a role in the struggle of justice. 
It should also be noted that numerous NGOs have been pursuing justice and have aided these 
three main organizations.  
 The Association for Justice and Reconciliation (AJR) is an NGO composed of victims 
from 22 communities who suffered during the genocide (“CALDH”, n.d.). AJR worked on a 
series of justice issues: they instigated the court cases against Rios Montt and Lucas Garcia for 
the crimes of genocide, they initiated the request to declassify a series of military documents, and 
they acted as witnesses (since they are composed of victims) on a series of cases (“CALDH”, 
n.d.). The NGOs AJR and Center for Legal Action on Human Rights in Guatemala (CALDH) are 
intimately twined: CALDH provided the legal services for the AJR. CALDH was founded in 
Washington DC during the armed conflict but moved back to Guatemala after the signing of the 
Peace Accords in 1996 (Martinez, 2015). CALDH has helped lead to landmark justice cases in 
Guatemala and also operated a few other influential programs: on addressing violence against 
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women,121 on fighting racism and discrimination,122 on the rights of indigenous peoples,123 and 
on youth rights (“CALDH”, n.d.).124 CALDH helped train other smaller justice NGOs thereby 
creating trained activists to generate more momentum in the plight against impunity. AJR and 
CALDH were instrumental in leading to some of the triumphs on the justice front.  
 Another NGO that helped fight for justice is the Mutual Support Group (GAM). In 1984 
GAM was established by a widow, Nineth Montenegro, who had sought to find information 
about her disappeared husband and used this motivation to create an NGO with other families of 
the disappeared (Skeen, n.d.). GAM’s goals were to provide advice and support to families of the 
disappeared who wanted information, wanted to conduct exhumations, and/ or wanted to hold 
burials. GAM enabled surviving relatives to access the compensation they were entitled via the 
National Reparations Law (Proyecto DIGAP, 2007). Finally, GAM’s eyewitness testimonies 
have led to convictions in cases of the disappeared. Unfortunately, GAM’s direct work on 
contested justice issues led to the deaths or disappearances of 90 of its members (Skeen, n.d.). 
The NGOs who have taken it upon themselves to address justice issues do so at their own risk. 
They have had to engage in work on disputed issues, issues that the Government would rather 
not address. 
																																																								
121 CALDH looks at the patriarchal society that existed during the conflict and still persists in post-conflict 
Guatemala. 
 
122 These root causes of the conflict are still persistent in society and have implications on current society. One 
example of the manifestation of this issue is the granting of licenses for natural resource extraction on indigenous 
lands 
 
123 CALDH has formed a program that creates a large indigenous community across the country who are aware and 
able to fight against the State’s current violations of their rights (ex: the exploitation of indigenous resources) 
 
124 CALDH created a youth program so that the youth can creatively express and educate the community about what 
happened during the conflict. The program strengthens other youth groups to ensure that youth rights remain 
protected. 
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 The above NGOs worked both within and outside the state’s structures on their pursuit of 
justice. The NGO’s have been fighting for justice since their human rights were violated and they 
continue the pursuit to this day.  
 
Competitive Relationship 
 
The Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan NGOs formed a competitive 
relationship when addressing justice grievances in the post-conflict period. A competitive 
relationship is one in which there are opposing goals and strategies. Some in the coalition 
Government did not want to pursue justice for crimes committed during the Civil War. NGOs, 
largely composed of victims from the Civil War, wanted justice for the crimes committed against 
them, their relatives, and their communities. These diverging goals led to two different 
approaches in the post-conflict phase. The Guatemalan Government implemented the Agreement 
on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic 
Society to an extent. Besides the partial Peace Agreement implementation, the Guatemalan 
Government did little in terms of a positive pursuit of justice. The Government’s creation and 
passage of the National Reconciliation Law to try to grant themselves amnesty demonstrated the 
Government’s intention to protect themselves. The Government has not prosecuted the cases of 
the attacks on human rights workers, such as the murders of GAM members, also demonstrating 
their anti-impunity efforts. Guatemalan NGOs, in contrast, pursued a very active strategy on 
addressing justice issues. The NGOs worked continuously to stop the rampant impunity in the 
state and to receive justice for their grievances from the Civil War. The NGOs took steps within 
the country, within the region, and within the world to seek justice. In the country, NGOs 
spearheaded the cases against ex-military officials in Guatemala, they provided evidence for the 
cases, and they served as crucial witnesses in the cases. In the region, the NGOs utilized the 
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Inter-American Human Rights Court system to pressure the Guatemalan Government to act and 
to gain more reparations than were granted purely by the Government. Finally, in the world, the 
NGOs utilized the norm of international jurisdiction to bring a genocide case to Spain. Although 
the case did not yield a decision, it did lead to the Guatemalan Government’s decision to initiate 
a national genocide case. With divergent goals, the two entities adopted opposing strategies in 
the post-conflict phase. 
 
Current State of the Implementation of the Peace Accords  
 
The hard work of NGOs has produced some positive implications on the justice front. 
The Guatemalan Government, particularly the judiciary, has acquiesced and taken certain 
landmark cases to trial, especially in the mid to late 2000s. In the years following the Peace 
Accords, the Guatemalan Government did implement judicial reforms as called for in the 
Agreement on Civilian Power. Nevertheless, just reforming the system was not sufficient to stop 
the impunity raging throughout the country. NGOs, therefore, had to work against political 
survival motivations and other obstacles to obtain justice. Furthermore, sentiments of justice and 
anti-impunity are reverberating across the country in the aftermath of the signing of the Peace 
Accords.  
 Besides the fact that trials have taken place, there are other important successes on the 
justice front. A victory was the opportunity for victims or families of the victims to share their 
stories as witnesses and in testimonies. For many who felt that their voices had largely been 
ignored following the conflict, the opportunity to testify provided a sense of justice. These stories 
also proved to be beneficial in courts of law for substantiating facts and evidence. Another 
success was the development of the National Reparations Program because it provided specific 
types of reparation, particularly material compensation, to some who suffered. This program was 
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especially important to many of Guatemala’s indigent populations for whom the money was 
significant. Other accomplishments included: increased access to the courts and protection for 
judges and witnesses.  
The number of victories that have taken place in regards to justice and the fact that cases 
have proceeded can in no way be minimized. However, there are a myriad of negative aspects in 
relation to justice that are ever present.  
A major hindrance in pursuing justice is political resistance. For some in the 
Government, it was in their best interest to counter the works by anti-impunity activists. 
Furthermore, some Government officials issued messages undermining justice efforts. 
Additionally, the state has yet to adopt a policy of support for the investigatory and punishment 
initiatives (“Concluding Observations”, 2012). Government reforms and initiatives have little 
strength and merit if there is not a sense of support behind them. MINUGUA noted that, “what 
has been lacking throughout is the political will to attack the structural issues, ensconced powers, 
and remnant ties to current and past military intelligence operatives, which are the deepest and 
most resistant impediments to the proper functioning of justice” (Mersky, 2005, p. 19) Justice 
cannot be achieved unless there is political impetus.  
Another negative aspect lays in the way that the Government plan, the National 
Reparations Program, has been implemented. The implementation phase focused only on the 
economic aspects of the program. This narrowed focus was most likely because economic 
reparation was the most straightforward and least contested route to grant reparations. However, 
the program involved five types of reparation and efforts on psychosocial support and on 
restoring dign
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was fulfilled with the closure found in the reparations program.125 However, if the program was 
inadequately implemented, then the grievances persist.  
Thousands of families of the disappeared still do not know about the whereabouts of their 
loved ones nor do they know information of what lead to their death. GAM has been active in 
discovering information on the thousands of the disappeared; however, the work of GAM and a 
few other NGOs is not enough. The state has done little on addressing this major issue. Even 
though the Peace Accords and others have called for a National Commission of Inquiry on the 
fate of the disappeared, one has yet to be established. Furthermore, there is not a centralized 
register of disappeared persons (“Concluding Observations”, 2012). The Commission and the 
register could both be helpful in justice cases for establishing facts and implicating certain 
individuals as perpetrators. 
As discussed in Chapter One, human rights workers are being attacked at alarming rates 
in Guatemala. Activists specifically focused on fighting for justice have been attacked at even 
higher rates than other activists since they are tackling contested issues. The attacks are 
spreading to include judges, scribes, members of the court, and witnesses who are attacked for 
their participation, opinion, and/or stances in certain anti-impunity cases. In fact, in the early 
2000s, 160 judicial officials complained about receiving death threats (Heasley et al., 2001). The 
intimidation of court officials was said to be the cause of the slow progress on the Dos Erres 
Massacre Case: forensic anthropologists found the remains of 162 bodies thus creating 
overwhelming evidence that should have led to cases right away, however, the local prosecutor 
refused to prosecute the case because he had received threats against him and his family 
(Heasley et al., 2001). Witnesses were receiving threats to discourage them from both testifying 																																																								
125 For many who had been waiting for justice and/or had been disillusioned by the struggle for justice through the 
court system, reparations helped alleviate their suffering and could in turn substitute for justice not received via the 
courts.  
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and pursuing investigations. Threats to both witnesses and judges are hampering the attainment 
of justice in Guatemala. Furthermore, the Guatemalan Government in the late 1990s directly 
hindered the pursuit for justice. President Alvaro Arzú in 1998 said, “those critical of his 
Government’s supposed advances in human rights protection and implementation of the 1996 
Accords were ‘traitors to the country’” (“Guatemala’s Lethal Legacy”, 2002). The Government’s 
own involvement with berating of activists indicated that, even after the Civil war ended, some 
in the Government sought to continue the regime of violence impunity. The attacks on social 
activists have not been challenged, investigated, or brought to trial (Amnesty International, 
2012).126 Thus, impunity continues to reign in post-conflict Guatemala.  
 There is a major problem concerning the makeup of powerful positions within 
Guatemala’s political system as large portions of the spots are filled by those responsible for 
massive human rights violations during the Civil War. Those in powerful positions gained 
immunity based on the constitutional law protecting Government officials from being indicted. 
Besides the major issues that stemmed from past perpetrators occupying powerful government 
positions, the implications of impunity are also felt at a local level. “It means that in many 
communities, victims often live next door to their victimizers, humbled daily by their own 
impotence” (Mersky, 2005, p. 32). The reality that victims may be forced to coexist with 
perpetrators highlights the issue of impunity still reigning in the country. The norm of impunity 
has kept the calls for justice alive because, until recently, cases were not taken to court for the 
human rights violations.  																																																								
126 The fact the cases have not been brought to trial is significant because it is part of the its international obligations: 
“As part of the Guatemalan State's obligations under international law to promote timely justice in the massacre 
cases, the State has several specific obligations requiring it to combat intimidation. First, threats against the judiciary 
violate the U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. Second, threats against lawyers or witnesses 
violate the U.N. Principles. Article 15 of the U.N. Principles calls for the protection of witnesses, complainants, and 
families of victims." Article 4 requires that prosecutors be permitted to perform their functions without intimidation 
or improper interference.' In addition, the U.N. Principles obligate prosecutors to prosecute cases of corruption and 
threats against judges, lawyers, and victims” (Heasley et al., 2001). 
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 Finally, a major negative aspect in terms of implementing the ideals of the Peace 
Agreement is how the slow progress of justice, the hindrance of judicial reforms, and a lack of 
political will to address impunity has led to new crime networks within the country.  A number 
of now retired, high-ranking military men, many of whom worked in the elaborate intelligence 
structures during the Civil War, have now converted their knowledge of clandestine operations to 
build their own crime networks. These networks commit a variety of crimes including: 
corruption, violence, “drug trafficking, trafficking of persons, contraband of arms, alcohol, and 
fuel, and money laundering” (The Washington Office on Latin America, 2015, p. 5). These 
structures have led to a post-conflict society riddled with crime; a society in which human rights 
violators go unpunished. 
 There are a few obstacles that have helped cause the negative justice aspects persisting in 
the country and which need to be noted to understand Guatemala’s complex relationship with 
justice. The obstacles include: lack of documentation, a new amnesty law, lack of funding, and 
the insistence on identifying victims.  
 For cases to go to trial, they need evidence to support the claims of human rights 
violations. There is a notable dearth of information regarding the Guatemalan Civil War. As 
noted in the timeline above, in 2007, the Guatemalan army received a request to declassify 
certain documents.  The Army did comply with the request but did not release the entirety of the 
documents. The still-classified documents presumably contain materials that implicate the Army 
for some crimes. There is a series of other documents which civil society organizations and 
judges have requested from the Army to which they have been denied access. Finally, “of grave 
concern is the notorious absence amongst the documents examined by the Commission of 
documents from the 1980-1985 period” (Amnesty International, 2012).  This time period was the 
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most violent of the Civil War and therefore the absence of documentation hinders court cases 
and obstructs full understanding of the consequences of the conflict.  
 Amnesty provides a degree of legal protection. The 1996 National Reconciliation Law 
applied an amnesty for those who committed crimes during the Civil War. However, a clause 
(article eight of the law) declared that amnesty did not apply to the crimes of genocide, torture 
and enforced disappearances. This clause permitted the justice cases to proceed. However, in 
2011, retired army officer, Rios Montt, accused of Genocide, submitted a constitutional appeal 
asserting the unconstitutionality of article eight. By requesting the repeal of the article, Montt is 
essentially requesting there be amnesty for genocide, torture and enforced disappearance. The 
Guatemala Constitutional Court is still considering this petition since Montt’s appeal is 
continuing to the present (Amnesty International, 2012).127 This petition is indicative of the 
continued resistance to anti-impunity measures by the Government.  
 Another obstacle to the pursuit of justice is funding. Like most government institutions, 
the judicial branch cannot function properly without adequate funding. The Guatemalan justice 
sector lacks sufficient funding to implement all the reforms, properly address human rights 
violations, and protect witnesses and judges (Heasley et al., 2001). When creating Guatemala’s 
budget, the state does not prioritize the judiciary branch, potentially out of self-interest. The 
judicial system needs funding to more adeptly address impunity and the formidable corruption in 
post-conflict Guatemala.  
 The final major obstacle to justice in Guatemala is the court’s insistence on identifying 
victims before investigating or prosecuting massacre cases. This focus on identifying means that 
prosecutors have “not pursued cases in which as many as 1,000 bodies were found in a mass 																																																								
127 This debate regarding the constitutionality of the article is ongoing. In 2013, during the Rios Montt trial, Montt’s 
defense team asserted this argument. As Montt’s appeal process continues, the debate remains ongoing.  
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graves if those bodies could not be positively identified, even when overwhelming evidence from 
other sources, including eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence supports the murder charge” 
(Heasley et al., 2001).  This insistence on identification means that cases are not being tried to 
their fullest extent, if they are tried at all.  
 The pursuit of justice in Guatemala has had a rocky and delayed path. There have been 
some landmark successes in the post-conflict society. Unfortunately, there are numerous 
negative aspects and obstacles that are hindering anti-impunity efforts. These mixed results are 
indicative of the competitive relationship that has formed between the Government and NGOs on 
justice issues.  
 
Why Competition? 
 
 The reason behind this competitive relationship is grounded in the Guatemalan 
Government’s desire to retain power. In the shift from conflict to democracy, many Guatemalan 
Government officials retained their positions. Those in power, however, were some of the major 
violators of human rights during the Civil War. Thus, any attempt at justice was a direct threat to 
their survival. The Government acted under the motivation of political survival. To retain power, 
the Guatemalan Government needed for the investigations, indictments, and charges against 
former and current Government officials to disappear. Their actions reflected this notion. The 
Government took a passive role in implementation of the Peace Accords and actively sought to 
impede justice with amnesty laws and threats/ intimidation. The work of Guatemalan NGOs was 
interpreted as a threat to the Government’s power and therefore the competitive relationship was 
adopted.  
 The NGOs eventually did have to work with the Guatemalan Government since court 
justice comes from the judiciary, a branch of the Government. However, this relationship 
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between NGOs and the judiciary was slow to form and still faces a myriad of obstacles (ex: 
threats and attacks, lack of will, a lack of information, certain regulations, and a lack of funding).  
 The competitive relationship between these two entities has slowed the pursuit of justice 
drastically. Though some landmark cases have been decided and publicized, many grievances 
related to human rights violations from the Civil War still persist. The competitive relationship 
has allowed for impunity to prevail in society. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
This project examined the implementation phase of the 1996 Guatemalan Peace Accords. 
This project was in response to the following questions: When do the Government and NGOs 
cooperate on peace accord implementation? When do they compete? And what drives these 
relationships? These questions have driven an in-depth analysis of three persistent societal issues 
and how they have been addressed following the creation and signing of the Peace Accords in 
1996 in Guatemala. The three post-conflict problems studied were human rights and 
memorializations, refugees and indigenous rights, and justice issues. The Guatemalan 
Government formed one of three types of relationships with the NGOs -- cooperative, 
complementary, or competitive -- depending on whether the issues addressed by the NGOs 
supported or challenged the Government’s political survival.  
 The Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan NGOs entered into a cooperative 
relationship on addressing human rights and memory issues. This relationship was based on the 
mutual goals of implementing the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, instilling 
human rights ideals through the country, and addressing memory issues. The strategies of these 
two entities were similar: the Government created new policies and programs that the NGOs 
supplemented with their own work. Furthermore, the Government and the NGOs interacted and 
worked together on dialogues. Guatemalan politicians entered into this type of relationship 
because they yearned to retain power in the newly democratizing country. Two aspects 
threatened the Government in the implementation phase: NGOs prior involvement on human 
rights issues and international presence and pressure. NGOs were engaged in the Peace Accords 
process through different dialogues and therefore had a higher stake in the implementation phase 
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and could have become less cooperative had the Government not actively implemented the 
Comprehensive Agreement. The international community played a role in the decision of the 
Guatemalan Government to enter into a cooperative relationship with the NGOs. The 
international community offered funding contingent on actual changes and implementation; this 
funding acted as motivation for the Government who recognized the need for financial resources 
in maintaining high public opinion of their work. The Government responded to the pressure and 
resources contingency and implemented the Accords with all their resources available, including 
NGOs’ help. Furthermore, the international community played a monitoring role. The 
Guatemalan state wanted to reestablish itself internationally. Therefore, to create a positive 
reputation, the Government utilized the NGOs to help implement the human rights ideals. I 
argued that on human rights issues, the Guatemalan Government formed a cooperative 
relationship with the NGOs as a way to strengthen their power by ensuring that they had funding 
and a strong reputation.  
The Guatemalan Government and Guatemalan NGOs entered into a relationship of 
complementarity on addressing refugees and indigenous rights. This relationship type focused of 
the mutual goals but diverging strategies. Chapter three separated the two populations to better 
demonstrate how the Government and NGOs interacted, however, the two are inherently tied 
together because many refugees were of indigenous descent and many refugees joined in the 
plight for indigenous rights upon returning to the country.  
While addressing refugees, the goal of both entities was to resettle those uprooted from the 
Civil War in a way that promoted stability and human rights. The Guatemalan Government 
created its own repatriation plan. This plan had failings for security and sustainability and was 
supervised by the still repressive army; therefore, the refugees largely rejected this plan. The 
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refugees then formed their own association, named the CCPP, to enter into unprecedented 
negotiations with the Guatemalan Government about their resettlement. The Guatemalan 
Government agreed to the terms of the CCPP negotiations and the refugees returned under this 
arrangement. The Guatemalan Government accepted this relationship with the CCPP out of a 
political survival motivation. The Government was under international pressure from the 
UNHCR and Menchu’s publicity regarding the large refugee crisis. This pressure encouraged the 
new Government, who was reliant on international support and funding, to act and accept what 
this large sector of society was demanding. The Government felt threatened by the domestic 
pressures. The Guatemalan Government was challenged directly by the CCPP. Furthermore, the 
refugees, while in exile, learned negotiating, organizing, and communication skills that presented 
a potential future threat to the Government. As a reaction to the real and perceived threats from 
the refugees, the Government formed a relationship of complementarity regarding the uprooted 
populations. 
 While addressing indigenous rights, the two entities entered into a relationship of 
complementarity because of their mutual goal (of promoting indigenous rights across the 
country) but acted through different strategies. The Agreement on Indigenous Rights was a major 
document that promised improvements for indigenous rights in almost all sectors of society. The 
Agreement also attempted to address root causes of the war: discrimination and stereotyping. 
The Guatemalan Government implemented the Agreement through a top down approach 
including policy changes, new programs, and development projects. The NGOs approached 
indigenous rights largely from a grass roots strategy, working mainly outside of governmental 
policies. The Indigenous Rights NGOs used their large numbers to develop activists, to educate 
indigenous communities and the general public, to develop projects to improve standards of life, 
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and to disseminate their plight. The large numbers of activists was the major reason that the 
Government formed this type of relationship. The Indigenous rights movement had been 
growing and gaining momentum through the Peace Accords process, so by the time of the 
implementation stage, the movement was vocal and large. This sizeable group could pose a real 
threat to the Government’s political survival if their interests were not appeased and grievances 
not addressed. The relationship of complementarity mollified the group and allowed for the 
mutual goal of improving indigenous rights to become the focus.  
 While addressing justice issues, the Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan NGOs 
entered into a competitive relationship. The Guatemalan Civil War left a plethora of human 
rights violations in its wake. These lingering grievances led to calls of justice and a goal to end 
impunity. Some in the coalition Government did not want to pursue justice for crimes committed 
during the Civil War because the Guatemalan Government and army were largely responsible for 
these crimes. Additionally, the newly democratic Government did not sweep out old government 
positions when the Civil War ended; rather, many perpetrators from the conflict retained their 
powerful positions. It was in the Government’s best interest to avoid justice and anti-impunity 
actions. NGOs, largely composed of victims from the Civil War, wanted justice for the crimes 
committed against them, their relatives, and their communities. These diverging goals led to two 
different approaches in the post-conflict phase. The Guatemalan Government did apply the 
judicial reforms as called for in the Peace Accords, however, they hindered calls for justice 
through a variety of mechanisms and obstacles including withholding information, amnesty laws, 
and intimidation of judges and witnesses. NGOs have been very active in pursuing justice. NGOs 
have been presenting cases to Guatemalan courts since the Peace Accords. They have used the 
principle of universal jurisdiction and utilized the Inter American Human Rights system and 
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Spain’s National Court in hopes of pursuing justice. The diverging goals and strategies are clear 
because any attempt at justice was a direct threat to those in power. To retain power, the 
Guatemalan Government needed for investigations, indictments and charges against former and 
current government officials to disappear.  
 The three relationship types -cooperation, complementarity, and competition- have 
played an important and influential role in the post-conflict phase in Guatemala. The 
relationships between the Government and the NGOs have led to real successes in the 
implementation of the Peace Accords. However, many obstacles and problems persist in the 
country. The two entities hold power in shaping how post-conflict Guatemala does and could 
look.  
 
Implications of Findings 
 
This project applied relationship theory and political motivation theory to the case study 
of Guatemala. This thesis has implications for both Guatemala and other nations facing 
challenges related to peace accord implementation.  
 This project will supplement the available literature on the Peace Accords by providing 
an overarching perspective of the implementation stage through the analysis of the consequences 
of the three relationship types in the post-conflict society. The relationships have shaped 
Guatemala into the country it is today. It is a country that was reeling from a devastatingly long 
conflict, went through a lengthy peace accords process, and underwent a series of changes to 
improve the country. On a surface level, the changes in Guatemala have been extensive. The 
Guatemalan Government implemented a series of reforms throughout the branches of the 
Government, they created new programs and positions, and they allowed for international 
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organizations (the UN, MINUGUA, and the UNHCR) to enter and work in the country. These 
changes reduced the de jure obstacles in the laws and policing in the country. The relationships 
have resulted in: the resettlement of uprooted populations, memorializations and 
acknowledgment of responsibility, an Agreement on Indigenous Rights as an effort to reduce 
discrimination, and a number of landmark anti-impunity cases. The three relationship types 
between the Government and the Guatemalan NGOs have resulted in some achievements in 
post-conflict society. However, there are a number of issues hindering progress in society. These 
obstacles are a result of the relationships due to lack of political impetus and direct thwarting 
actions. The obstacles have also impeded the effectiveness of the relationships’ actions. The 
largest issues stem from the impunity that reigned, and continues to reign, for the last 20 years in 
the country. This impunity has led to a new round of human rights violations to occur: the 
rampant attacks on human rights workers. It has also led to the development of new criminal 
networks that threaten to destabilize the country. The impunity-based issues are partially a result 
of the relationships during the Peace Accord implementation phase. The Government, in some 
instances, was unwilling to aid in the pursuit of justice and has taken a fairly neutral stance 
towards the attacks on human rights defenders. The relationships between the two entities have 
also failed in addressing all aspects of the Peace Accords, on instilling human rights ideals 
throughout the country, and on eliminating the root causes of the war, specifically racism and 
inequality. The Government and the NGOs have created successes in post-conflict Guatemala, 
but there are a multitude of persistent problems. The relationship types have impacted how the 
Government has acted, how civil society has reacted, and how post-conflict society has improved 
and regressed from 1996 to the present. Since there are lingering problems, the relationships will 
also continue to affect future Guatemala.  
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 This project also has broader implications. There is a dearth of research on the 
implementation phase of the peace accords. Scholars have noted the volatility of the 
implementation stage and that effective implementation often stems from quick actions. There is 
an absence of information about how to effectively implement the accords and how the 
implementation phase can best proceed. This study contributes to existing literature on peace 
accord implementation by applying relationship theory and political motivation theory to the 
case of Guatemala, demonstrating that implementation and the type of relationships the 
government adopts is drastically affected by a Government’s desire to retain power  
 In peace accord research, the importance of including certain aspects in the content of the 
accords is well documented. However, this thesis can supplement the current literature with the 
application of political motivation into the literature on the content of peace accords. The case 
study of Guatemala illuminated the role of political motivation on the content of the accords. The 
Guatemalan Government wanted to retain international funding and support, to create a positive 
international reputation in the new democratizing state, and to subdue and contain the large 
population groups from becoming threats during the implementation phase. The Guatemalan 
Peace accords did contain funding contingencies that helped the implementation process. 
However, the Accords also contained ideas that did not increase the Government’s willingness to 
act, namely the provisions in the Accords for justice. The Guatemalan Government may have 
been more willing to form cooperative and complementary relationships with NGOs had the 
content of the Guatemala Peace Accords been more amenable to their political desires. 
 The Guatemalan case study can be used to extrapolate on political motivation’s power 
within the content of the accords. As peace accords traditionally proceed, the multiple groups/ 
sides/ entities will negotiate and agree on the content of the accords.  The Accords hypothetically 
	 102 
should lead to an easy implementation phase because the content was created out of 
compromises. However, as evidenced by Guatemala, this is not so simple. Political motivation of 
the government, the entity primarily responsible for implementation, can play a significant role 
in the implementation of peace accords.   The accords need to be implemented by a willing 
government. How, then, can peace negotiators ensure government willingness? The theory of 
political motivation can enlighten this. There are two avenues to apply this theory.  
 The first way would be to make the content of the accords, and their subsequent actions, 
something that would strengthen the government’s position, thus playing into the political 
motivation of the government. A government will implement peace accords more efficiently and 
effectively if the content of the accords will strengthen or better its position in the eyes of its 
citizens and the world. So to improve the implementation phase, the contents of the peace 
accords should be amenable to the desires of the implementing government.  
The other avenue in which political motivation can be applied through peace accord 
content is based on contingency. A government may be forced to implement accords if the 
content of the peace accords creates contingencies. These contingencies could be funding and/or 
support (both internationally and within the civilian population). Funding keeps governmental 
institutions and programs running (a key indicator to civilians about the effectiveness of the 
state) thereby incentivizing the government to react to the contingencies to maintain power and 
support among their civilians. Furthermore, the contingencies would ensure others had a stake in 
the process. The ‘others’, entailing both international actors and civil society, could become a 
threat to the government (through reputation judgments, shaming, and actual protests) if their 
goals were not met. By making the content of the peace accords reflect contingencies, a 
government may act out of political motivation and implement the accords.  
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 The case study can serve as an advisory to NGOs on the way they could best become 
included in a post-conflict society. Relationship theory examines how a government and NGOs 
interact. This project can demonstrate the numerous ways that NGOs could become involved 
with the government. Each relationship type illustrated NGO engagement. The easiest way to 
become actively involved for NGOs is through cooperation since it is a relationship out of 
amiability. This relationship type, however, requires the NGOs to subscribe to the strategy and 
goals of the government, and, therefore, limits their autonomy. Relationships of complementarity 
create good conditions for NGOs to pursue their goals because they can adopt a strategy that 
their organization is better prepared to use, rather than a strategy the government decides to 
pursue. For NGOs the relationship that makes their work most difficult is one of competition 
because the force of the state will be working against the work of the organization. However, as 
evidenced by Guatemala, even relationships of competition can lead to progress despite 
oppositon (for example, the recent anti-impunity and genocide cases). The relationships formed 
in Guatemala illustrate potential avenues for NGOs to pursue in other post-conflict societies.  
 This project, by applying relationship and political motivation theory to Guatemala, has 
illuminated a variety of implications for both Guatemala and the broader study of peace accords 
and civil society activism.  
 
Possible Future Points of Interest 
 
 This project’s case study of the implementation phase of the Guatemalan Peace Accords 
is focused on the specific interactions between the Guatemalan Government and an assortment of 
Guatemalan NGOs. This case study looked at political motivation as the reason for the 
relationship type assumed on each major grievance. There are future points of interest within 
Guatemala and on a broader scale.  
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In Guatemala, three main issues could be analyzed further: the continuing 
implementation phase, the international players, and the genocide case. The implementation of 
the Guatemalan Peace Accords is ongoing, begging the question of whether the remaining 
grievances will be addressed. In the last decade there have been significant victories on the 
justice front. Accordingly, how will these landmark cases influence Guatemalan society and will 
anti-impunity actions extend to cover the attacks on human rights defenders and the new criminal 
networks? Furthermore, the project points out persistent negative aspects and obstacles to the 
implementation of the Accords analyzed on all three sub-cases (human rights, refugees/ 
indigenous rights, and justice). How will these aspects and obstacles be addressed in the 
upcoming years? This thesis mentioned international players in all the chapters, specifically the 
UN and UN missions. Another potential avenue for research would be to better understand the 
role of international players in the post-conflict phase, particularly their role in funding, their 
influence on reputation of the country, and their monitoring role. Additionally, during the Peace 
Accords process Guatemala signed and ratified a series of international treaties which played a 
role on the actions of the Government since the country was now bound to international 
standards and also subjected to international reports and monitoring. The role of these 
international laws on the implementation phase could be another opportunity for research. 
Finally, in Guatemala, the genocide could be further studied.  Within the genocide are a few 
lingering questions: when does international jurisdiction apply? And why did the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) not take the genocide case and how did that decision influence the national 
genocide case?  
 On a broader scale there are two aspects that this research illuminates for further study. 
First, are there other cases that are similar to Guatemala in terms of relationships and political 
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survival motivations? To best explore this potential pattern it would be best to begin with similar 
situations: other Latin American countries that faced civil wars, genocides, and/ or dictators 
during this period. Then if a pattern is discovered, research can be done exploring whether it can 
be applied to other cases globally that have similar conflicts.  These bridges in conflict and post-
conflict studies could help academics understand the phases better but also could benefit 
governments and large intergovernmental bodies like the UN to best create peace and progress. 
The second aspect is whether one relationship type leads to more successful implementation of 
peace accords than the others. Each of the three relationships studied reaped benefits and 
successes but also suffered from negative aspects and obstacles. Though cooperation logically 
would yield the most effective implementation, this case study has demonstrated that even in a 
relationship of cooperation problems persist. Therefore, another researcher could establish a 
scale of effectiveness to evaluate the relationships during the Guatemalan implementation phase.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 6: Timeline of Major Political Events from the Civil War -the Present128 
Date Event 
1954 Overthrow of President Arbenz 
1960 Failed nationalistic uprising, Violence began in Guatemala 
1981-1983 Government’s use of the Scorched Earth Policy 
1982 URNG Formed 
1978-1985 Bloodiest period of Civil War, Genocide 
1980s Creation of Civil Defense Patrols 
1983 Creation of Development Pole Villages 
1985 New Guatemalan Constitution 
1986 1st democratically elected president, Vinicio Cerezo, took office 
1990 Beginning of formal peace negotiation process 
1993 Ramiro de Leon Carpio assumed the presidency 
1996 National Reconciliation Law 
1996 Alvaro Arzu was elected president 
1997 Deployment of MINUGUA 
1999 Failed Voter Referendum 
1999 The Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations released report 
2000 Alfonso Portillo was elected president 
2004  Oscar Berger was elected president 
2008 Alvaro Colom was elected President 
2012 Otto Perez Molina was elected President 
2015 Otto Perez Molina resigned amid corruption scandal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
128 Information from Agency and Department, 2012 and Costello et al., 1997 
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